

JPRS-TND-94-012  
7 June 1994



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## ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-012

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7 June 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## Expanding Nuclear Safety Cooperation Viewed

### Official Comments

OW1505070994 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 0358 GMT 15 May 94

[By reporter Zhang Rongdian (1728 2837 0368)]

[Text] Beijing, 15 May (XINHUA)—A decade has passed in the development of China's nuclear undertakings and nuclear safety supervision and administration since it started building the Qinshan and Daya Bay nuclear power plants in the 1980's.

During this period, China has built a very efficient nuclear safety supervision and administration system. An international regulatory review mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], a working visit to China recently, concluded that China's nuclear safety supervision and administration system conforms to the standards of usual international practice.

Huang Qitao, director general of the National Nuclear Safety Administration [NNSA], which is an independent government department with jurisdiction over nuclear safety supervision and administration, said in an interview with this reporter: The fact that China—young in terms of nuclear energy development—is able to attain the level it has achieved today in nuclear safety supervision and administration can be attributed to its active participation in international cooperation.

He stressed: China is positive, open-minded, and unreserved when it comes to promoting international cooperation and exchanges in nuclear safety. NNSA has signed agreements on cooperation in nuclear safety with the United States, France, Italy, Spain, Pakistan, Germany, and Japan. It has also maintained regular contacts and conducted exchanges with a number of countries with which no such agreement has been signed. China will also sign agreements on cooperation in nuclear safety with a number of other countries.

Huang Qitao said: In regard to nuclear safety supervision and administration, China has received generous support from the United Nations Development Program [UNDP], IAEA, EC, and other international organizations. They have provided China with technical training, information, computer software, and other data relevant to the safe operations of nuclear plants. He said China has also taken an active part in international cooperation in nuclear safety under the auspices of the IAEA, including the entire processing of drafting of the "International Convention on Nuclear Safety" under IAEA sponsorship. China will fulfill all the obligations provided in the convention when it is signed.

Huang Qitao said: China has gained a great deal of valuable experience from its active and frequent participation in international cooperation and exchanges. It has

also made its experience available to other countries without any reservations. For this reason, all participants are beneficiaries of international cooperation in nuclear safety. He noted that China will step up its efforts in international cooperation on nuclear safety and take an active part, as ever before, in international cooperation sponsored by the IAEA.

Annick Carnino, head of the international regulatory review mission, also noted in an interview with XINHUA while she was in China: The IAEA will strengthen cooperation with China in nuclear safety supervision and administration and provide assistance, to the extent possible, in making preparations for dealing with nuclear emergencies.

### Further Comments

OW1505075794 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0718 GMT 15 May 94

[Text] Beijing, May 15 (XINHUA)—China has built a very effective nuclear safety administration system during the past 10 years when China started its construction of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant and the Guangdong Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant in the '80s.

During a recent visit to China, the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed that China's nuclear safety administration system reached the standards of usual international practice.

China's progress in this area is closely related to its active international cooperation, according to Huang Qitao, director general of China's National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA).

He said that China's attitude towards international nuclear safety cooperation and exchanges is active, open and unreserved, adding that NNSA has signed cooperative agreements with a number of countries while maintaining regular contacts with some other countries having no such agreements with China.

Huang noted that China has received support from some international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), IAEA and the European Community, which provided China with materials, computer software, and information concerning safety in nuclear power plants.

He said that China also takes part in international cooperations of IAEA including the drafting of the International Nuclear Safety Convention, and China is ready to discharge all obligations when the convention is signed.

In an interview with XINHUA, Ms. Annick Carnino, head of the IRRT of the IAEA, said that IAEA will strengthen its cooperation with China in nuclear safety administration and is ready to provide China with help in nuclear emergency planning and response.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**NODONG SINMUN Denounces ROK's Work on Fast Breeder Reactor**

SK0805085394 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
0838 GMT 8 May 94

["Development of Fast Breeder Reactor Must Be Stopped at Once"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 8 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today denounces the South Korean puppets' move to develop a fast breeder reactor under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, secure larger quantities of plutonium and manufacture nuclear weapons with it, as an unpardonable archcrime against the nation.

The news analyst says:

The white paper on the development of a fast breeder reactor by the South Korean puppets, which was recently issued by the South Korean National Democratic Front, shows how desperately the South Korean puppets work to develop nuclear weapons.

The South Korean puppets claim that the fast breeder reactor is the "most efficient source of energy" and its development is needed for "economic value." Their third-rate trick, however, cannot work.

They are desperately working to develop this type of reactor because they scheme to produce large quantities of nuclear weapon-grade plutonium and increase the amount of its stockpiling through legitimate import of plutonium under the pretext of feeding the fast breeder reactor.

The Kim Yong-sam puppet clique must close down the pressurized heavy water reactor and the multi-purpose reactor and immediately stop the development of a fast breeder reactor before it meets with a bitter denunciation and rejection at home and abroad as a nuclear maniac.

**KCNA Condemns 8 May Deployment of ROK Vehicle in DMZ**

SK0905060394 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
0548 GMT 9 May 94

["South Korean Puppets Perpetrate Grave Military Provocation in DMZ"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 9 (KCNA)—The South Korean puppets perpetrated a grave military provocation Sunday [8 May] by deploying an armored vehicle in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) South of Ipo-ri, Kumgang County, Kangwon Province, in the eastern sector of the front.

At about 18:55, the puppets drove an armored vehicle into the DMZ along the Military Demarcation Line from Sohwa-myon, Inje County, South Korean Kangwon Province, and took a firing posture against the North side.

They introduced recoilless guns and large-calibre machine-guns into the DMZ southeast of Kwijon-ri, Jangpung County, in the western sector of the front and installed them in a position on May 1, 3 and 4. They displayed a war frenzy, firing some 70 bullets of large-calibre machine-guns from the same spot on May 5.

At about 11:15 May 6, hundreds of puppet Army bandits armed with large-calibre machine-guns and automatic rifles staged a frantic war exercise against the North in broad daylight in the DMZ south of height 1211 in the eastern sector of the front, getting on the nerves of the North.

The South Korean puppets brought some ten trucks loaded with hundreds of armed bandits into the DMZ South of Mabang-ri, Chorwon County, Kangwon Province, in the central sector of the front at about 08:46 May 2.

The number of the armed bandits brought by the South Korean puppets into the DMZ in the first eight days of May for the reinforcement of the positions and military facilities and for war exercises totals more than 6,400.

This arms buildup of the South Korean puppets, timing to coincide with different frantic war exercises against the North with the mobilization of up-to-date lethal weapons and fighter planes in collusion with the U.S. imperialists, is a deliberate and premeditated military provocation to drive the situation along the Military Demarcation Line to a dangerous phase.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets must refrain from rash acts, clearly seeing the grave touch-and-go situation caused by their war provocation moves on the Korean peninsula.

**Minister Expects 'Positive Progress' in DPRK Nuclear Issue**

SK1205020194 *Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean*  
0100 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Yi Hong-ku, deputy prime minister and minister of the National Unification Board, said that the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks are likely to be held next week when the International Atomic Energy Agency begins additional inspections of North Korea.

In a breakfast meeting with newspaper editors today, Deputy Prime Minister Yi Hong-ku predicted that positive progress [kungjongjogin chinjon] will be made in resolving the nuclear issue in the coming week and stressed: Although the replacement of fuel rods has been postponed, the sampling [sonjong], preservation [pogwan], and special measurement [tuksu kyechnik] of samples must be conducted without fail.

Deputy Prime Minister Yi said: The government will no longer emphasize the importance of holding South-North dialogue ahead of U.S.-North Korean talks [sonhu kwangye-e chipchakhaji anul kosimyo], and is now focusing on North Korea's guarantee of nuclear transparency in resolving the issue.

He stressed: The ROK and the United States firmly share the view that if North Korea possesses even half a nuclear weapon, it would be regarded as an act of nullifying the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

**Seoul Editorial Criticizes DPRK for Unsupervised Fuel Rod Change**

SK1405120994 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
14 May 94 p 3

[Editorial: "North Korea's Gambling With Nuclear Fuel Rods"]

[Text] North Korea has reportedly begun to change fuel rods at nuclear reactors without the presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team. This act pours cold water on an atmosphere in which a new phase of dialogue finally became possible as North Korea agreed to follow-up inspections, including additional inspections of its radiochemical laboratory, which has been an issue for a long time.

North Korea probably has the hidden aim to baffle its counterparts, the IAEA and the United States, by even more complicating the nuclear issue to have a favorable negotiating position. I am greatly concerned about North Korea's act because it is an extremely dangerous gamble that may cause a crisis.

The international community, including the United States, repeatedly warned North Korea that if North Korea proceeded with changing the fuel rods on its own, they would suspend dialogue with North Korea and apply sanctions through the UN Security Council. Accordingly, if North Korea's notification to the IAEA that it began changing the fuel rods means a full-pledged change, sanctions against North Korea will become inevitable and the situation on the Korean peninsula will become more unstable.

When North Korea agreed to the additional inspections of the radiochemical laboratory and it appeared likely that the IAEA inspection team would enter North Korea on 17 May to start its inspection activities, we expected a small breakthrough in resolving the nuclear issue.

Our expectation was based on the view that North Korea would postpone changing the fuel rods to seek a solution to the nuclear problem at the third round of talks with the United States.

The contents of North Korea's message to the IAEA leaves room for negotiations. The message says that North Korea will allow the preservation of fuel rods for samples if North Korean-U.S. high-level talks result in a package solution to the nuclear problem. Also, the position of the IAEA and the United States is that they will prepare countermeasures after receiving the results of additional and follow-up inspections, which will be conducted as planned despite North Korea's notification.

The IAEA inspection team plans to carry out additional inspections of the radiochemical laboratory in addition to basic activities—such as replacing batteries and film in the monitoring camera installed at the experimental reactor, whose fuel rods are supposed to be changed this time, and confirming the seals of the reactor. U.S. policy is that after receiving the results of these inspections, it will decide whether to hold the third round of talks with North Korea.

North Korea's attempt to change the fuel rods under this situation is not a wise decision although it might be a strategy to lead negotiations in a direction favorable to North Korea. Changing the fuel rods without IAEA taking

samples will only increase the international community's suspicion that North Korea is trying to hide its extraction of nuclear materials. In addition, it will make dialogue with the United States, which North Korea desires, impossible and will possibly result in sanctions against North Korea through the UN Security Council.

The international community will hardly put up with North Korea's dangerous gamble any longer. North Korea is urged to find a way to negotiations while there is the possibility of dialogue.

**Dailies React to DPRK Replacing Fuel Rods**

SK1505101794

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles published in 15 May Seoul vernacular newspapers on North Korea starting to replace the fuel rods at its five megawatt-class atomic reactor without the presence of International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, inspectors.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 2 a 700-word article by Pak Tu-sik on the true intention behind North Korea replacing the fuel rods. The article begins: The ROK, the United States, the IAEA, and Western countries agree that if "North Korea replaces the fuel rods without the presence of the IAEA," it will lead to a "catastrophe." Citing that such a decision by North Korea is a "reckless plot" to further their own interest, the article stresses that "no decision can be made" until the IAEA inspection team makes a "report" on the result of its inspection. After noting that North Korea's decision to replace the fuel rods is a way to hold the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks, the article points out the replacement work may only be in its preparatory stage and that the actual replacement of the fuel rods has not begun. The article concludes that the judgment of the IAEA inspection team will determine if North Korea has actually started replacing the fuel rods at its atomic reactor.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO on page 3 publishes a 900-word article by Nam Chan-sun in Washington on the true intention of North Korea's decision to replace the fuel rods of its atomic reactor without the presence of the IAEA inspection team. The article gives four reasons for such a decision: First, North Korea publicized its decision to replace the fuel rods in order to hold the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks at an early date. Second, there is a high possibility that North Korea is using the fact that the IAEA inspection team, which will leave for North Korea on 15 May, will inspect the five megawatt-class atomic reactor anyway. Third, the decision is aimed at obtaining publicity from home and abroad of its position by rejecting the claims by the United States and the IAEA that the replacement of the fuel rods must not be carried out without the presence of the IAEA. Fourth, there is a possibility that it was necessary to replace the fuel rods to maintain the safety of North Korea's facilities and meet technological demands, as North Korea claims. The article concludes by reporting that no decision can be made until the IAEA inspection team concludes its inspection.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN on page 3 publishes a 800-word editorial entitled: "The North Korean Nuclear Issue Is Bringing About UN Sanctions." The editorial notes that it seems that the United States and



the ROK have been "dragged along by North Korea's nuclear strategy." Noting that North Korea has a habit of unilaterally severing and then resuming negotiations at the last moment, its decision to replace the fuel rods is intended to "drive a wedge" in holding the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks. Citing that North Korea is trying to settle for a package deal of "improving relations with the United States, obtain support for its light-water reactor, achieve economic cooperation, and conclude a peace agreement on the Korean peninsula," the editorial notes that since North Korea's true intention has now become clear, "the United States must take a more resolute measure" regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. The editorial reports that if North Korea does not stop the replacement of the fuel rods and does not receive IAEA inspections, this will only lead to sanctions by the UN Security Council. The editorial repeatedly urges that as a responsible member of the international society, North Korea must work to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.

KYONGHYANG SINMUN on page 3 publishes a 1,200-word article by Yi Chong-yon in Washington on North Korea's unilateral notification that it has started the replacement of the fuel rods at its atomic reactor. The article reports that diplomatic sources in Washington analyze that North Korea's decision to replace the fuel rods is a "strategic card to realize the DPRK-U.S. talks at an early date." The article reports that diplomatic sources feel it is very unlikely that North Korea replaced the fuel rods, but has only started safety inspections for replacement. The article continues that the United States will decide what to do after obtaining results by the IAEA inspection team. The article concludes that it will be decided to present the nuclear issue to the UN Security Council after the IAEA carries out its inspection next week.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 900-word article by Kim Cha-su entitled "The Government's Reaction to the Replacement of Fuel Rods by North Korea." Referring to the government's embarrassment regarding North Korea's 14 May announcement that it has independently begun changing fuel rods at its five megawatt-class nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, the article writes: "This is because the government has so far adhered to the strong position that it will resume the discussions on sanctions against North Korea if it begins changing fuel rods at the nuclear reactor without IAEA supervision."

Noting the government's analysis of North Korea's public announcement that it has begun changing fuel rods, the article reports that the government will formulate concrete plans to deal with North Korea after IAEA inspectors complete their inspection activities in North Korea.

The article reports: "The government stresses that it has no other choice but discuss sanctions against North Korea with other countries concerned if the IAEA declares the continuity of the nuclear safeguards has been suspended, and that it has decided to convey such a position to North Korea through various channels," referring to the government's attention to North Korea's remarks to the IAEA that the issue of selecting and preserving fuel rods can be resolved at the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks. The article continues that the government is ready to deal

with North Korea, believing that this week it will be determined if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved peacefully.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 900-word article by Washington-based reporter Chong Hae-yong entitled: "Washington's Position on North Korea's Replacement of Fuel Rods." Referring to the contents of North Korea's message sent to the IAEA on 12 May and analysis by Washington-based sources of the background of North Korea's replacement of the fuel rods, the article reports that North Korea's announcement to change fuel rods is intended to hold negotiations with the IAEA, as well as to discuss economic cooperation and establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 700-word article by reporter U Tae-chun entitled: "The Present Conditions of an Experimental Nuclear Reactor in Yongbyon." The article reports that "North Korea has operated an experimental nuclear reactor in Yongbyon since 1986." The article concludes: "Western experts believe that the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon will turn out to be a nuclear reprocessing plant after noting its size based on data provided by North Korea to the IAEA and the basic reason for the replacement of fuel rods at the nuclear reactor and the method of extracting plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel."

#### **ROK Poll Says 39.1 Percent Believe DPRK Has Nuclear Weapons**

SK1605113994 Seoul YONHAP in English  
1110 GMT 16 May 94

[Text] Seoul, May 16 (YONHAP)—Six in every 10 South Korean adults believe there is the danger of North Korea provoking a war on the Korean peninsula, an opinion survey said Monday.

The poll, taken by the Korea Gallup Co., showed that 11.8 percent of the pollees replied they believe there is much danger of a war being unleashed by the North Koreans and another 46.1 percent said they think there is slight danger of such war.

The survey, conducted in a contract awarded by the Information Ministry, was made toward 1,000 people aged 20 or more across the country on May 2-3.

Of the respondents, 37.0 percent said they don't see any danger of North Korea provoking a war.

The percentage of those who denied war danger was high, 54.4 percent, among those with college or higher educational background.

As reasons for denial of the danger of war, 16.9 percent gave the flow of international situation against war, 12.2 percent lack of economic strength to wage a war on the part of North Korea, and 10.9 percent the North's inability to fight a war on their own.

As to the fate of the Kim Il-sung system, 33.6 percent said they think the system would survive while 66.7 percent replied it would collapse either gradually or in the foreseeable future.

Asked if they think North Korea would open itself up, 7.5 percent said it would open totally, 61.3 percent it would partially, and 27.2 percent it wouldn't open at all.

On the question of whether to resume the Team Spirit exercise, 45.7 percent said the training should be held regardless of North Korea's attitude and 35.0 percent said decision on the issue should be made depending on North Korea's attitude.

Only 19.3 percent said they think the exercise shouldn't be held regardless of the attitude of North Korea.

Concerning the nuclear question, 39.1 percent said they believe North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons, and 21.9 percent North Korea is in the threshold of developing them.

Mere 3 percent said they believe North Korea has no ability at all to produce nuclear weapons.

Of the total pollees, 85.1 percent said they think North Korea's human rights conditions are very serious, and 93.4 percent said North Korea is experiencing a difficult economic situation.

Meanwhile, 69.7 percent of the pollees supported the government policy of accepting North Korean loggers in Siberia.

About North Korean escapees in China, 40.9 percent said South Korea should accept them while 22.6 percent said the government should help them resettle in China or other third countries.

Another 29.2 percent said the matter should be handled very prudently taking into account China-North Korea relations, and only 6.2 percent said South Korea shouldn't accept them.

## JAPAN

### Foreign Minister Denies Secret Japan-U.S. Nuclear Deal

OW1005025794 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0235 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] Tokyo, May 10 KYODO—Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa denied Tuesday [10 May] that Japan and the United States concluded a secret agreement in 1969 under which the U.S. can redeploy and transport nuclear weapons in Okinawa Prefecture in case of emergency as was claimed in a soon-to-be published book.

"Such a secret agreement does not exist as the government has been saying," Kakizawa told a press conference.

According to a book to be published Thursday, Japan and the U.S. concluded the secret deal during summit talks between then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon in November 1969.

The author of the book is Kei Wakaizumi, a former professor of international politics at Kyoto Industrial University, who, as Sato's special envoy, negotiated the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control with Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security affairs adviser.

### IAEA Asks Tokyo To Measure Unaccounted for Plutonium

OW0905131894 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1301 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Tokyo, May 9 KYODO—The United Nations atomic watchdog has asked the Japanese Government to reconfirm the amount of plutonium held up in processing equipment of a Japanese nuclear fuel fabrication plant after learning the amount was unexpectedly high, sources said Monday [9 May].

The sources said a massive 70 kilograms of plutonium was held up at the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. facility in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, over the past five and a half years since the plant started operations.

The fact has alerted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since such a large amount of plutonium held up in the plant could hamper effective application of safeguards against unauthorized diversions of plutonium, the sources said.

A corporation spokesman stressed, however, that employees at the facility have confirmed the existence of the plutonium through measurements done with special equipment and denied the plutonium in question is unaccounted for.

But the sources said the IAEA is concerned that any discrepancy in calculations could compromise its purpose as a body established to regulate the use of nuclear fuel and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The facility, which began operations in October, 1988, supplies fuel to the fast breeder reactor Monju on the Sea of Japan coast in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.

Sources within the nuclear power industry said that in April, the IAEA requested that the government confirm whether the amount of plutonium held up in the plant actually matched the corporation's own measurement.

Equipment to monitor plutonium amounts in the facility was jointly developed by the corporation and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the U.S. State of New Mexico.

A measurement by the equipment is believed to have a margin of error of 5-10 percent, which means that if the amount of held-up plutonium is as much as 70 kilograms, enough plutonium to make an atomic bomb could easily escape detection.

Paul Leventhal, president of the nongovernmental Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute said 70 kilograms is more than the amount of plutonium North Korea is alleged to have secretly diverted from its own nuclear facilities.

Leventhal said there is no proof Japan is diverting plutonium for a weapons program, but called on the IAEA to closely regulate the Japanese facility to ensure fair treatment for all countries using nuclear power.

In a letter dated May 4 to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Leventhal calls for the shutting down of the facility.

Leventhal told Christopher the 70 kilograms, about 10 percent of the annual plutonium output at the plant, is "an astounding figure."

"Under the circumstances, Japan should be prepared voluntarily to suspend operation of the plant in the interest of its often-stated commitment to the complete transparency of the peaceful nature of its plutonium program," Leventhal wrote.

A spokesman for the Science and Technology Agency's safeguards division said the IAEA and the government gauge the amount of plutonium held up in the plant once every month, and added it is impossible to divert the plutonium from the facility.

### **Panel To Propose Delaying Plutonium Plant's Construction**

*OW1105133494 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1244 GMT 11 May 94*

[Text] Tokyo, May 11 KYODO—Yielding to mounting foreign pressure, a government energy policy advisory panel is set to propose reviewing Japan's ambitious plan to use plutonium for energy, government officials said Wednesday [11 May].

The proposal by the Advisory Committee for Energy will lead to a policy shift by the Atomic Energy Commission, the nation's top energy policy board, which is now working on reviewing Japan's long-standing policy of hoarding plutonium.

In an interim report to be presented in early June to the minister of international trade and industry, the committee's subpanel on nuclear energy will propose delaying construction of a second plant to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to reproduce plutonium, the officials said.

"The commission's review is likely to reflect a policy change by the advisory panel," said a senior official at the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy.

The official said the policy change also reflects a glut in global uranium supply and the resulting fall in demand for plutonium as a result of the end of the Cold War. Uranium is a key nuclear fuel.

"With uranium prices and demand for plutonium down, it will be hard to make ends meet given the cost of building related facilities," he said.

Construction of the plant is a key part of Japan's program to develop widespread use of nuclear technology for fast-breeder reactors that produce more plutonium than they consume.

Japan is the world's only country to continue work on development of fast-breeder reactors and has been accused of undermining nuclear nonproliferation as plutonium is a key component in nuclear weapons.

Although Japan has flatly denied any intention of developing nuclear weapons, its pro-plutonium policy has spawned speculation that it may build its own nuclear arsenal in the future.

The committee's subpanel report will also propose reserving spent nuclear fuel as it is, describing it as

"resources which are temporarily reserved" for future use. Plutonium can be extracted from spent fuel.

The proposal suggests that nuclear policymakers still weigh the value of domestically processed plutonium and hold out prospects for future use of plutonium.

Japan relies heavily on nuclear power for its energy needs, with some 30 percent of the nation's electricity being generated by 42 nuclear plants.

### **Panel Drafts Plan Reviewing Plutonium Use**

*OW1205132194 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1305 GMT 12 May 94*

[Text] Tokyo, May 12 KYODO—A government advisory panel Thursday [12 May] outlined an interim report on Japan's nuclear power policy that proposes review of its longstanding policy of encouraging plutonium use, a Trade Ministry official said.

The report drafted by a subpanel of the Advisory Committee for Energy calls for delaying construction of a second plant to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to reproduce plutonium.

Japan will decide on a schedule for construction around 2010, according to the report to be presented to the International Trade and Industry Minister June 10.

The second plant was originally scheduled to begin operations around 2010.

The review reflects global concern over nuclear proliferation in Japan and the recent setback in nuclear recycling projects in Europe, the official at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry said.

The official said the report proposes limiting Japan's nuclear recycling to a nuclear power plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, and its attached facilities until the second reprocessing plant is completed.

The report describes the postponement as a temporary setback in the nation's policy of promoting plutonium use, citing the heavy dependence on nuclear energy.

The subpanel report proposes reserving excessive plutonium produced at the Rokkasho plant for future use.

### **Enough Plutonium at Tokai-Mura for 'Eight Warheads'**

*LD1305160394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1540 GMT 13 May 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Japan imposes nuclear game rules on the world while accusing Russia of developing new weapon types, concluded Russian experts when 70 kilos of unregistered plutonium were founded in reactors of a Japanese splitting fuel plant at the Tokai-Mura Nuclear Center.

Seventy kilos are enough to make eight nuclear warheads. Specialists put into question Japanese claims that the pure plutonium powder "stuck" to the equipment and pipes.

While storing unregistered raw materials for nuclear bombs Japan continues to spread sensational rumors on

Russian development of a new small-size neutron bomb on the basis of red mercury. It gives the new bomb's parameters - a size of a coffee cup, and address and possibilities of its use - Bosnia, a terror weapon. [sentence as received]

In the opinion of experts, this is done to conceal Japanese secret nuclear activities. According to IAEA norms, eight kilos of plutonium are enough to make a bomb and dangerous for non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

The revealed materials make one doubt "full transparency of the plutonium peace use programs" against the background of Japanese claims it is a model state in the sphere of nuclear control, said the experts.

This opinion is confirmed by a classified report of the U.S. Institute for Control over Nuclear Materials submitted to the U.S. secretary of state. Some paragraphs of the report have leaked and were used by the press.

Deputy head of the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Power Engineering's Information and Public Relations Department Vitaliy Nasonov told ITAR-TASS the report on Japanese plutonium requires more studies, as it is hard to reveal the plutonium source

#### **Plutonium To Be Transported by Sea 100 Times in Decade**

*OW1805142794 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1409 GMT 18 May 94*

[Text] Tokyo, May 18 KYODO—Japan will have to transport plutonium by sea more than 100 times over the next decade under its plans to have its spent nuclear fuel recycled in Europe, a Tokyo-based antinuclear institute said Wednesday [18 May].

Jinzaburo Takagi, head of the Citizen's Nuclear Information Center, said, "ships loaded with radioactive substance will make the round trip between Europe and Japan in a period shorter than a month."

The frequent transportation would result in harsh criticism from countries along the ships' route, he said.

The Japanese freighter Akatsuki Maru carried plutonium from France back to Japan from November 1992 to January 1993, sparking widespread protests both at home and abroad.

Japan has signed contracts to have about 7,100 tons of spent nuclear fuel recycled into plutonium in Britain and France.

Under the center's calculation, 45 tons of plutonium will be produced from the spent fuel by around 2010.

Also, Japan will have to take back about 3,200 cylinders of vitrified high-level radioactive waste and 150,000 drums of low-level radioactive waste, that are produced in the recycling process, they said.

The 45 tons of plutonium must be transported by sea in 20 shipments, high-level radioactive waste in 30-60 shipments and the low-level radioactive waste in 50-150 shipments, they said.

Takagi criticized the government for having made only limited preparations to accept the waste as it has decided merely to store 1,440 cylinders of vitrified waste at a

reprocessing facility now under construction in the village of Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, he said

#### **Tokyo To Slow Plutonium Use Due to Foreign Criticism**

*OW1805133794 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1316 GMT 18 May 94*

[Text] Tokyo, May 18 KYODO—Japan's top nuclear policy board unveiled a plan Wednesday [18 May] to slow down remarkably its plutonium use for nuclear recycling, facing criticism from abroad and domestic circles that Tokyo may develop nuclear arms out of the substance.

The Atomic Energy Commission has worked on revising Japan's long-term nuclear energy policy, in which the country's plutonium use would be considerably delayed from the current program.

Aside from the criticism, the changes in the policy are being made as it has become less necessary for Japan to hastily make use of plutonium energy as prospects for future uranium supplies have brightened, officials said.

The committee headed by Science and Technology Agency chief Mikio Omi will draw up a final plan by the end of June, they said.

The new program requires Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel as the need arises so that excess plutonium would not be produced, and to store excess spent nuclear fuel for a long period, the officials said.

Under the current plan set in June 1987, spent nuclear fuel would be swiftly recycled into plutonium and be reused.

The new policy does not change the government's fundamental stance that it is indispensable for Japan to establish a nuclear energy recycling system as the country has only scarce energy resources, they said.

Another point of the plan, to recycle all of the country's spent nuclear fuel, is also kept intact, they said.

Japan will proceed with only limited nuclear recycling for the moment, however, including some recycling of plutonium in light water reactors, they said.

The country's long-term nuclear energy policy was drawn up for the first time in 1956 and is revised every five years by the committee.

The current program calls for Japan to put into operation a reprocessing plant in the village of Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, now under construction and expected to be completed by around 2010.

But the new policy cites that the scale and other plans on the plant will be decided by 2010, the officials said.

Japan's only reprocessing plant is being operated in Tokai-Mura, Ibaraki Prefecture, and the Rokkasho plant would be the second in operation.

The Tokai-Mura plant has had frequent problems and has not begun full operation. The delay in operation of the Rokkasho plant would leave Japan with large quantities of spent nuclear fuel.

But Japan will store the fuel until the country is able to recycle in the future, they said.



Japan will also back down from its current policy on development of fast breeder reactors, they said. The planned start of construction of a demonstration fast breeder reactor will be delayed from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, they said.

The launch of a commercial fast breeder reactor was not changed from the current target of around 2030. But fast breeder reactors will be consistent with light water reactors under the new plan, in comparison with the current policy in which they are placed as Japan's future main reactors, they said.

Also, Japan will not breed plutonium as long as fast breeder reactors are at the experimental level, the officials said.

Japan's prototype fast breeder reactor "Monju" reached criticality in April, the point at which the reactor's fissionable material is capable of sustaining a chain reaction at a constant level.

Monju, in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, can breed more plutonium than it consumes, causing several countries abroad to express concern that Japan may use the substance for future nuclear armament.

As a result of the changes in fast breeder reactor development, Japan's amounts of both supply and demand of plutonium by 2010 would be reduced to between 69 and 79 tons, the officials said.

The current plan said the amount of the supply would be 85 tons and demand 80-90 tons.

#### **Hata Denies U.S. Nuclear Pact, Rejects DPRK Relations**

*OW1205093994 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0916 GMT 12 May 94*

[Text] Tokyo, May 12 KYODO—Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata denied Thursday [12 May] that Japan had secretly agreed with the United States in 1969 to allow Washington to deploy nuclear arms on Okinawa island to defend Japan and America's other Asian allies in times of emergency.

"Although former Prime Minister (Eisaku) Sato and U.S. President (Richard) Nixon were recently alleged to have signed the secret agreement, such a pact does not in fact exist," Hata told the House of Representatives plenary session.

"My government will firmly continue to live up to Japan's three antinuclear principles," Hata said in response to Tomichi Murayama, leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) [of Japan, SDPJ], the nation's No. 2 opposition party.

The three principles bar Japan from manufacturing and authorizing foreign nations to bring to or store nuclear weapons on Japanese soil.

Hata was referring to a recent allegation in a book authored by Kei Wakaizumi, a former special emissary of Sato, in negotiations with the Nixon administration, that led up to a 1969 accord to return then U.S.-held Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty without the presence of nuclear weapons there.

Wakaizumi, a former Defense Agency researcher, alleged Sato and Nixon signed the top-secret memorandum at the White House on November 21, 1969. The memorandum says Japan is aware of U.S. expectations for a favorable response to possible U.S. requests to deploy nuclear weapons on Okinawa in times of a contingency.

Wakaizumi, who negotiated with then National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger on behalf of Sato who sought Okinawa's return without nuclear arms, quoted Sato as saying, "Because Mr. Nixon signed (the memorandum) with his full name, I also signed it with my full name."

The former lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University said Sato demanded that the signing be shrouded in secrecy for fear of angering Japanese media people, many of whom were then balking at the Japan-U.S. security treaty.

Murayama told the Diet, "Then the special envoy of Prime Minister Sato exposed the secret agreement that authorizes the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in times of a contingency, which was inked after the announcement of the Japan-U.S. communique in November 1969."

Hata issued his denial after the SDP leader rapped the government for allowing the presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa by referring to the recent crash of two F-15 U.S. jet fighters, which Murayama said pained Okinawan residents.

Hata also spurned Murayama's demand to immediately resume negotiations with North Korea to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang.

"Japan will never normalize its relations with North Korea unless the country clears up international suspicions over its suspected nuclear weapons program," the premier said.

He urged Pyongyang to comply with the U.N. Security Council presidential statement, which called for North Korea to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct unimpeded inspection of its nuclear facilities.

On a related topic, Hata also said Japan's Constitution prohibits the country's involvement in collective security, brushing aside concerns that his government may move toward active military actions overseas.

"I think collective security is beyond the boundary of the Constitution, and it is in practice not permitted," he said.

"I have no intention to change" the conventional interpretation of the Constitution by the postwar Japanese Government on the issue, he said.

He was responding to a query by Yohei Kono, president of the Liberal Democratic Party, the No. 1 opposition party.

Although Japan has the right for collective security in terms of international law, Hata argued the war-denouncing Constitution only grants Japan the "minimum necessary" rights for self-defense.

Hata also displayed a cautious stance toward the proposed legislation to deal with a contingency on the Korean peninsula.

The issue requires a "highly political judgment" and "should be considered cautiously," he said.



The remark is an apparent effort to distance himself from some key cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa, who recently called for early steps toward legislation for dealing with international emergencies, such as the crisis over North Korea's suspected nuclear arms program.

However, in a reply to Murayama's similar question, Hata said, "The government is now considering such legislation to eliminate any ambiguities (concerning a response to a contingency) as it should appeal to the public to endorse it when necessary."

#### **Book Claims Nuclear Weapons Pact Reached With U.S. in 1969**

OW1005001894 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0000 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] Tokyo, May 10 KYODO—Japan and the United States concluded a secret agreement in 1969 under which the U.S. can redeploy and transport nuclear weapons in Okinawa Prefecture in case of emergency, according to a book to be published Thursday [12 May].

Kei Wakaizumi, a former professor of international politics at Kyoto Industrial University, said in his new book that the two countries concluded the secret deal during summit talks between then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon in November 1969.

According to the book, a draft of agreed minutes to the Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué Nov. 21, 1969, stated in part, "In times of great emergency the United States government will require the reentry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan."

The agreed minutes also said, "The Government of Japan, appreciating the United States Government's requirements in times of great emergency as stated above by the President, will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes place."

As Sato's special envoy, Wakaizumi at the time was negotiating the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control with Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser.

The U.S. had maintained a presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa before the territory was returned to Japan by the Nixon administration in 1972.

Prime Minister Sato had insisted then that Japan would reject the reentry of nuclear weapons into Okinawa even if there were prior consultations.

### **NORTH KOREA**

#### **Defector's Comments on Pyongyang's Plutonium Production**

##### **Production Since 1988**

SK0905091494 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0800 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] North Korea has pushed ahead with the development of nuclear weapons since 1986 and now has a considerable amount of plutonium. This was revealed by

Kim Chae-ho, who defected recently to the South, during a press conference held at the Seoul Press Center this afternoon. Before he defected, Mr. Kim was the head of a work team at the Sanamchon Chemical Complex, a uranium refinery plant under the North Korean Ministry of Nuclear Energy. Mr. Kim said North Korea began to develop nuclear weapons in 1986 and was able to produce plutonium in 1988.

Mr. Kim, who escaped from North Korea on 2 February because the North Korean authorities became aware of the fact that he misappropriated \$5,000 in foreign currency, said plutonium has been continuously produced in the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. He claimed that although he does not know whether North Korea has a nuclear weapon, North Korea has attained a considerable technological standard for the development of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, brothers Hwang Kwang-chol and Hwang Kwang-il said they crossed the border to China last June because they were caught stealing food and lived a life of those who enter China illegally. Elder brother Hwang Kwang-chol, 20, said that because of the haphazard food rationing in North Korea, stealing food is a frequent practice there.

#### **More on Defectors' News Conference**

SK0905110994 Seoul YONHAP in English  
1052 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Seoul, May 9 (YONHAP)—Despite its lingering economic difficulties, North Korea has invested heavily in uranium mining and production, a recent North Korean defector said here on Monday.

"I have no idea whether North Korea presently possesses nuclear arms because they have been developing them in utter secrecy. But, I can tell North Korea's nuclear development has reached a dangerous point," the defector, Kim Tae-ho, said in a press conference.

In the North, Kim, age 35, had worked at the Atomic Power Industrial Ministry. He was the head of a waste water disposal team at the Namchon Joint Chemical Industrial Co. run directly by the Atomic Power Ministry.

He said uranium ores are being mined at several mines including the one in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province; January industrial mine at Pyongsan, North Hwanghae Province; and Wolam mine at Kumchon, North Hwanghae Province.

"The uranium ores from these mines are shipped to two uranium refineries at the April Industrial Co. in North Pyongan Province and Namchon Chemical Co. in North Hwanghae Province," he said.

The re-refinery August Industrial Co. in Yongbyon, Kim said, extracts plutonium for nuclear weapons and performs work related to the production of uranium fuel rods.

He said that Namchon Chemical Co. has about 8,000 workers and turns out 80%-pure uranium.

"Many of the workers there are exposed to radioactivity, complaining of vocational diseases such as liver ailment, depilation and leukosis," the defector said.

Productivity at these workshops, however, is extremely low due chiefly to superannuated facilities, he said.

For instance, Kim said, uranium ores transportation is sluggish as many trucks are idled due to the lack of tires and mechanical troubles are reported often at mining equipment.

He said he was born in Jilin Province, northern China, because of which he had been discriminated against. "Besides, I was involved in a swindle case, which made me decide to defect to the South," he said.

Two youthful brothers who came to the South along with Kim Tae-ho spoke of terrible food conditions in the North.

Hwang Kwang-chol, 20, said that due to food shortage, women in childbed are often stricken with serious diseases and it is not rare babies fail to walk even at two due to malnutrition.

Hwang said his own mother is serving a 15-year prison term after she stole a bag of corn from a neighbor in 1987.

"Together with my younger brother, Kwang-il, 18, I crossed the Tuman River last June and had since been living in Yanji before we boarded a South Korean freighter with the help of an ethnic Korean in China," Hwang said.

The three North Koreans arrived in South Korea last Saturday.

## Official View on Fuel Rod Replacement Stated

### Foreign Ministry Announcement

SK1405154794 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1528 GMT 14 May 94

[“DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Reiterates DPRK’s Stand on Replacement of Fuel Rods”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry today answered a question put by KCNA regarding the beginning of the replacement of fuel rods at the 5 megawatt experimental nuclear power station.

He said:

As is known, the replacement of fuel rods has begun at our 5 megawatt experimental nuclear power station according to its operation plan.

This refueling is part of the undertakings to normalize our peaceful nuclear activities.

As we have clarified time and again, we could not freeze the operation of the graphite moderated reactor system for an indefinite period, incurring economic losses, since the prospect of implementation of the DPRK-USA agreement on converting the graphite moderated reactor system to a light water reactor system became dim as a result of the abortion of the third round of talks.

Moreover, the replacement of fuel rods at the 5 megawatt experimental nuclear power station could not be delayed any longer in view of its technical safety.

That is why we sent a telex message to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on April 19 informing it of

our replacement plan in advance and requesting it to observe it and promptly take necessary measures for the replacement of fuel rods.

Later, we sent telex messages to the agency on four occasions, repeatedly requesting it to take relevant measures including the removal of seals for a smooth operation of the facilities. And we agreed to all the demands of the agency with regard to its observation, except for the selection and preservation of the fuel rods, a matter which is beyond our unique status, and issued in good time entry visas to the agency’s inspectors.

Moreover, we allowed, as an exception, inspection activities for the continuity of safeguards requested by the Secretariat of the agency and even an “additional inspection” which it described as an “uncompleted inspection” during its inspection in March, taking into consideration the fact that the United States withdrew the precondition of “exchange of special envoys between the North and the South of Korea” which it had insisted on.

The Secretariat of the agency, however, persistently avoided sending a group of inspectors on unreasonable pretexts and did not take necessary measures for the replacement of fuel rods. Under such conditions, we had no other choice but to remove seals and start taking out fuel rods for safety reasons.

In this connection, we notified the agency that the whole course of the replacement of fuel rods would be placed under a strict watch of the agency’s cameras.

All this was motivated by our utmost sincerity to prove the non-diversion of the replaced fuel rods to non-peaceful purposes and demonstrate the uprightness of our nuclear activities.

It is self-evident that such inspection activities falling under the categories of routine and ad hoc inspections as selection and preservation of some of the fuel rods can never be allowed in view of our unique status following a temporary suspension of the effectuation of our declared withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

To select and preserve some of the fuel rods at this juncture means to take samples. This is an inequitable attitude ignoring our present unique status which excludes ad hoc inspection, and a prejudiced, unreasonable demand blindly casting “suspicion” on the DPRK.

We have already clearly notified the IAEA that we will contain all the spent fuel under strict surveillance of the IAEA and fully allow the IAEA to measure it when the nuclear issue is settled between the DPRK and the USA.

It is hardly understandable for the IAEA Secretariat to insist on selecting and preserving some of the fuel now, though it will be able to get the most correct results if it measures all the fuel at that time.

This makes us suspect that the IAEA Secretariat is not interested in the measurement of the fuel rods but is seeking the political purpose of gradually undermining our unique status under the cloak of measurement.

In its report on the results of the inspection in March at the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the United Nations

Security Council, the Secretariat said it was "indispensable" to wind up the "incomplete inspection activities" at the radiochemical laboratory. So, we allowed them and now the Secretariat says it is "indispensable" to select and preserve fuel rods. This proves that there is no credibility in the attitude of the Secretariat.

This makes us conclude that the Secretariat's demand for selecting and preserving fuel rods at this juncture is aimed at fabricating another "inconsistency" which was one of the root causes of our withdrawal from the NPT and justifying its partiality toward the DPRK.

In view of our unique status, we are only obliged to provide the continuity of safeguards through the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material, not the verification of the completeness and correctness of the initial inventory.

Though we decided to strictly contain the fuel rods and put them under the control of the agency, some quarters of the United States are now spreading the rumor that we are changing the fuel rods to extract plutonium enough for the manufacture of four or five nuclear bombs. This is quite contradictory to the fact and cannot be construed otherwise than a sinister intention to intensify pressure on the DPRK under the pretext of refueling.

Actually, refueling is taking place under the watch of the cameras installed by the agency. So, there is no ground to worry about the diversion of the replaced fuel rods for another purpose.

Now some quarters are contending that if we stopped and put off refueling, the problem of observation might be solved. This is, however, an unrealistic speculation that does not take into account the characteristics of the technical safety of our experimental atomic power plant.

If refueling is stopped midway, it may cause a new danger in the view of safety.

But we think that since refueling has just begun, there still remain possibilities to resolve the problem.

We proposed to the agency negotiations for an agreement on practical matters related to the presence at the replacement of fuel rods along with complicated outstanding issues with it.

The solution to the issue depends on the attitude of the agency.

If the agency persist in its unreasonable demand, ignoring our unavoidable conditions regarding the replacement of the fuel rods, the issue would become more complicated.

We will as ever make every possible effort for a fair and fundamental solution to the nuclear issue.

#### More on Announcement

SK1405155594 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1535 GMT 14 May 94

["Replacement of Fuel Rods of 5 Megawatt Nuclear Power Station Begins"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said the replacement of fuel rods has begun at the 5 megawatt experimental nuclear power station according to its operation plan.

Answering to a question put by KCNA, he said this refueling is part of the undertakings to normalize our peaceful nuclear activities and it could not be delayed any longer in view of its technical safety.

The Secretariat of the agency persistently avoided sending a group of inspectors on unreasonable pretexts and did not take necessary measures for the replacement of fuel rods. Under such conditions, we had no other choice but to remove seals and start taking out fuel rods for safety reasons, he said, and went on:

Though we decided to strictly contain the fuel rods and put them under the control of the agency, some quarters of the United States are now spreading the rumor that we are changing the fuel rods to extract plutonium enough for the manufacture of four or five nuclear bombs. This is quite contradictory to the fact and cannot be construed otherwise than a sinister intention to intensify pressure on the DPRK under the pretext of refueling.

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## TAIWAN

### Defense Minister Says Taipei To Buy U.S. Patriot Missiles

*OW1305140094 Taipei CNA in English  
1314 GMT 13 May 94*

[By Benjamin Yeh]

[Text] Taipei, May 13 (CNA)—The Republic of China [ROC] is about to sign a contract with the United States to buy Patriot missiles, National Defense Minister Sun Chen said Friday [13 May].

Sun made the statement in reply to an inquiry by Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Trong Chai, who demanded that Taiwan step up its defense capability to guard against the possibility of attack by Mainland China.

Sun, the former president of National Taiwan University, told the legislative chamber that of the missiles currently available in the world, only the Patriot is capable of intercepting missiles.

He said Taiwan would purchase the Patriot model known as the PAC- II, a revised model of the one that functioned effectively against Scud missiles fired by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.

Sun said negotiations for the arms sale have been under way for some time, and are almost complete. Yet he did not reveal the value of the arms sale.

Sun also told the legislature that the first squadron of locally manufactured Ching Kuo jet fighters, better known as "Indigenous Defensive Fighters," will be commissioned before the end of the year. They will be equipped with Tien Chien, or "Sky Sword" air-to-air missiles, he said.

The air force is scheduled to acquire 120 of the combat aircraft. Taiwan has also contracted to buy 150 us-made F-16s and 60 French Mirage 2000-5s.

The army also has completed the deployment of the first battery of Tien Kung ground-to-air missiles, Sun said. Dubbed "Sky Bows," the missiles were developed by the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology.

## BRAZIL

### Space Agency Head on U.S. Proliferation Concerns, MTCR

94WP0077A Sao Paulo ISTOE in Portuguese  
23 Mar 94 p 75

[Article by Jayme Brener and Luiz Antonio Novaes]

[Text] The Brazilian Government is ready to undertake a prickly mission: convincing the White House that Brazil's space program is completely peaceful. In other words, that our satellite launch rockets will neither don military uniforms nor transform themselves into missiles capable of landing in our neighbors' territories. In February, the government announced it would adhere to the terms of the MTCR [acronym as published] [Missile Technology Control Regime - MTCR] an international treaty that restricts missile production. And the new Brazilian Space Agency (a sort of green-and-yellow NASA), which acquired its first directors in early March, is likely to permanently disconnect the program from any military content, in the eyes of the Americans. Until February, when the agency was created, the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE), linked to the Armed Forces General Staff, was responsible for this project. The oaths taken as to the peaceful nature of our space program will probably also appear on the menu at the meetings that U.S. Vice President Al Gore will hold in Brasilia this week. Major General Ajax Barros de Melo, 59, the new director general of the space agency, confirmed the overtures to the United States, saying: "We want to make it plain that we really never had military objectives." The United States acknowledges the blandishments: "The creation of the civilian agency puts relations between the two countries back on track," commented an American diplomat.

There is a clear motive behind these Brazilian signs of good will: a relaxation of the veritable blockade the White House has been imposing on Brazil's space mission. Since the United States suspects that a parallel missile program exists, it has always done everything possible to keep Brazil from accessing the most sensitive technology. One American diplomat told ISTOE that his government went so far as to prohibit the presentation of certain books to Brazilian scientists. A study that the White House commissioned in 1993 from the Rand Corporation, an ultraconservative research institution, concluded that the Brazilian space

program is "not economically viable." Unless its true objective were the production of missiles. The skirmishes between the two countries peaked at the end of last year, when Brazil accelerated its participation in a joint program with China for the launching of two observation satellites. At the time, the military command signalled that Brazil might attempt to obtain, from the Chinese and Russians, the special technology denied it by the United States and its allies.

The Brazilian space program calls for the launching of four communications satellites. The first two in the Brasilsat series are already in orbit. It is expected that another will take off in 1995, mounted on the nose of a Brazilian satellite launch vehicle (SLV). The Sino-Brazilian project, in turn, includes the launching of two observation satellites, the first in 1996. "Our space mission has not only created about 5,000 highly specialized jobs, it transferred First World technology to different sectors of civilian industry," said Marcio Barbosa, director of the National Institute of Space Research (INPE) in Sao Jose dos Campos (SP). One of the examples of this technological transfer occurred at the Esca company, of Barueri (SP), which is involved in the Sino-Brazilian satellites project. Esca used the aerospace know-how to develop cheaper plastic bottles for soft drinks.

Even with all the guarantees offered the United States as to the civilian objective of the space mission, there is little possibility that the Brazilian project will get a powerful injection of the latest technology in the near future. "I do not think our potential partners will help us build the SLV," Ajax de Melo said. "We will have to do it right here." And even if it has "adhered to the conditions" of the missiles limitation agreement, there are still doubts that Brazil will actually sign the document, an action that would make the White House more tractable. "There will be no formal signature. We are adults and we will do what Russia and China did, which is simply to declare that we will adhere to the terms of the agreement," the general explained. After enduring spartan budgets when Fernando Collor was president, the SLV is supposed to get US\$40 million from the government between now and 1995. And its development may yet provoke new frictions with the Americans. After all, as Ajax de Melo noted, "if you build a rocket and put it into orbit, you can aim it anywhere you want. We have that capability and the Americans know it. That is what sovereignty is," the officer concluded.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Pakistani Spokesman Expresses Fear Over Arms Race With India**

BK1305140294 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 13 May 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Avoiding a missile race"]

[Text] A spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Office has expressed concern over the Indian decision to deploy Prithvi and Agni missiles on the grounds that it will greatly enhance the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the region. While Pakistan in the context of its security environment is more concerned with the short range Prithvi missile, it is the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Agni, that has a range of 2500 km and can carry a heavy payload, which, to an even greater extent, underlines India's aggressive defence posture. A missile of this type, in the presence of a high degree of accuracy, is significant not least because of its ability to carry nuclear warheads over a long range. This has caused even countries well beyond the region to question India's intentions. However, given the unfortunate history of conflict between India and Pakistan, the latter has felt more compelled to take defensive measures with regard to India's ambitious missile programme. Apart from attempting to develop indigenous missile technology to the best of its ability, Pakistan has incurred a small number of M-11 missiles from China. It has argued in response to US pressure on this score that the acquisition of these missiles does not violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the real issue here is that if Pakistan perceives a major threat to its security as a result of the imminent deployment of the Prithvi missile, it is bound to take steps that provide it with the minimum necessary level of deterrence.

The matter is further aggravated when India's activities in this realm are seen in tandem with its ambitious and secretive nuclear programme. It is in this context that the Foreign Office spokesman has expressed legitimate fears. It is time for India to consider the cost of a prohibitively explosive race in the realm of missiles and nuclear weapons for the extremely deprived masses of the region. Neither country can really afford to enter into such a race. Certainly, Pakistan is already having to spend far too much on defence primarily because of India's continual enhancement of its already formidable defence capability as well as its aggressive stance, not just towards Pakistan, but the countries of the region, in general. Finding a solution to the nuclear issue in South Asia remains a difficult task not least as a result of India's intransigence in this regard. But, meanwhile, it would be eminently sensible if a beginning could be made on the missile front. If India were to restrain the production and deployment of missiles, it would contribute in bringing down the level of tension between the two countries and score an important confidence building measure that could possibly pave the way for progress on the more complex nuclear issue. Perhaps US policy-makers could take up the matter with the Indian prime minister on his upcoming visit to the United States. It would be even better, of course, if India were willing to make the issue a subject of meaningful bilateral negotiations with Pakistan.

**Pakistani Commentary Sees Indian Missiles as Threat to Peace**

BK1405104394 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in English 1600 GMT 13 May 94

[Commentary by Mohammad Yamin]

[Text] India's decision to deploy long-range nuclear missiles—Prithvi and Agni—has caused understandable concern to Pakistan. The Indian move will greatly enhance the threat to peace and security in South Asia and as a spokesman of Pakistan's Foreign Office observed the other day, it will raise the specter of a nuclear arms race in the region. In view of the ongoing internal uprising held in Kashmir and the unresolved dispute between India and Pakistan over the future status of Jammu and Kashmir, and also the historical fact that there have been three major armed conflicts between the two countries since their independence, Pakistan will be the most likely target of India's newly acquired military muscle. In long term, of course, there will be other countries who would also have to face up to the reality of life when India decides to flex its muscle in pursuance of its hegemonic designs in the region and its ambition of becoming a regional superpower.

Pakistan has, therefore, conveyed its concern over the matter to the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, countries that include, among others, the United States. Hopefully, the MTCR nations would respond positively to Pakistan's message and exercise their collective and individual influence over India to give up dabbling in nuclear missilery and other weaponry of mass destruction.

Given India's intransigence over the issue, or for that matter over any bilateral or multilateral issues throughout 47 years of its existence as an independent nation, the pursuance of Pakistani request by the MTCR countries is going to be a formidable task. The Indian prime minister has given a fair proof of it. Addressing the Indian Parliament on the eve of his departure for the United States on an official visit, Mr. Narasimha Rao chose to rule out the possibility that he might agree to roll back India's nuclear or missile program during his U.S. trip. In fact, his decision for any such suggestion was forceful and vehement and he remarked that a leader would be worthless if he changed the policies of his government during visits to foreign countries. He reiterated that his government would firmly adhere to its nuclear and missile development policies. (While) on one hand, India is pressing ahead with its militaristic designs and augmentation of its military might at a hectic pace, on the other hand, it is [word indistinct] upon its own brand of disinformation and spread of false propaganda against Pakistan. To blame the revolt of Kashmiri people against the Indian occupation on Pakistan is easy enough. It now holds Pakistan responsible for trouble even inside its northeastern states that are over a thousand mile distance from Pakistan. It is also engaged in repeating the wild stories of Pakistan's complicity in last year's bomb blasts in Bombay. Along with its diplomatic and publicity offensive, India is also busy in acts of sabotage and mischief in liberated areas of Kashmir. It is also indulging in violations of the airspace of Azad Kashmir. Several Indian military helicopters flew along the Line of Control on 5 May and on two occasions, they crossed over into Azad Kashmir, besides two Indian terrorists were apprehended recently in Kotli sector of

Azad Kashmir. They were carrying 52 kg of explosives and had confessed that they were on a sabotage mission at the behest of the Indian authorities. All these have ominous forebodings for peace and tranquillity in South Asia, particularly the deployment of Agni and Prithvi missiles must be seen as an important landmark in India's nuclear capability and a clear adoption of a threatening posture against small neighbors, Pakistan being on the top of the list.

#### **Pakistan's Navy Chief Says Indian Navy Missile Program 'Ominous'**

BK1605095494 Islamabad THE NATION in English  
16 May 94 pp 1, 4

[Text] Karachi (APP)—Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Saeed M. Khan said here on Sunday that India's hegemonic aspirations can only spell trouble for smaller states in the region.

Addressing student-officers of PN [Pakistan Navy] Staff College here, Admiral Saeed said India's interest in seeking naval cooperation with regional countries is aimed at allaying regional apprehension about its naval buildup on the one hand and isolating Pakistan in the region, on the other.

India is also trying to portray China as an "external" adversary to justify its naval expansion, now that it has retracted its opposition to U.S. presence, he said.

The Naval Chief further said that Indian Navy is reportedly working on a programme for development of nuclear propulsion capability. Seen in the context of its nuclear capability and a comprehensive ballistic missiles programme this is ominous having profound and far-reaching implications for the entire region Admiral Saeed said.

He said, with the stoppage of U.S. aid in 1990, the Pakistan Navy received a major setback when three PNC Orion Aircraft, which had been cleared for release, were withheld. Later, the U.S. also insisted on the return of eight warships on expiry of their lease, Admiral Saeed added. He further said, despite all difficulties the country was on way to building a fairly modern and balanced fleet of a reasonable size.

Admiral Saeed said, the recently acquired type 21 Frigates after being updated, would adequately fill the gap created by the return of American ships. Pakistan Navy's submarines fitted with Harpoon Missiles can deliver powerful punch, but their numerical strength is below the required level.

About mine hunters, the Admiral said, Pakistan Navy's deficiency in mine countermeasures capability has been made up by the purchase of three modern mine hunters.

He said that in the present strategic scenario and in the face of continuing Indian naval expansion there is no choice but to consolidate our navy through self-reliance. He added, a long term programme has been placed before the government for building a series of surface ships at the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) in collaboration with a foreign Yard. Admiral Saeed said, this would be a major step forward which would also catalyses [as published] development in various industries in the country.

The Naval Chief said that the next few years are going to be crucial and to tax all our resources-financial, material and personnel. He added, if managed and harnessed well these resources will give the country the much needed maritime defence capability.

On his arrival earlier at the PN Staff College, Naval Chief Admiral Saeed M. Khan was received by the College Commandant, Commodore Serfraz Khan.

Flag Officers and other senior naval officers were also present on the occasion.

### **INDIA**

#### **Government Policy on Agni Missile Questioned**

94W/P0090B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
23 Apr 94 p 12

[Editorial: "Unkindled Agni"]

[Text] The Prime Minister's denial in Parliament that the Agni missile programme was being shelved under American pressure will only partially remove public misgivings on this score. Indeed, Mr Narasimha Rao's remark that "there is no pressure from the United States (and) hence there is no question of yielding to it" is unlikely to satisfy everyone, considering that the Americans have made no secret of their deep displeasure with India's experiments with rocket technology and have been trying their best, including compelling Russia to renege on the cryogenic deal, to force India to abandon its various projects. The U.S. pressure has been there even before the time of the first launch of the Agni in 1989 when India claimed success in joining an exclusive club of the Big Five and Israel by mastering the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) technology. What has led to the renewed speculation about American intentions is obviously the fact that the reports about the capping of the Agni programme have followed close on the heels of the Strobe Talbott visit during which the Americans tried to persuade India to join a regional nuclear disarmament conference which carries the threat of imposing restrictions on various technological experiments. It would have been better, therefore, for the government to be more explicit about the Agni project during the Rajya Sabha debate.

The observation of the minister of state for defence, Mr M. Mallikarjun, that the flight of the Agni "was only a technology demonstration" and that it was "yet to be decided whether it should be converted into a missile programme" was no more than a reiteration of what is known. In the present context, the government might have clarified whether it would persist with the experiments. This is all the more necessary because the third test-firing of the Agni last February was also described as the final launch which had reportedly met all the requirements of the objectives set for the mission. As Dr Abdul Kalam, director-general of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, said, "so far as technology is concerned, we have demonstrated our capability" and it was now "for the government to take a political decision for its induction in the armed forces." According to some reports the government is considering three options: to develop Agni as a weapon of war or to continue perfecting the IRBM technology but not using warheads as evidence of

India's peaceful intentions, or to drop the programme altogether. Given the conditions in India's immediate neighbourhood, there is no question of opting for the third alternative, but whatever the government's decision, it must be seen to have been taken purely on merit and not under any compulsion.

#### Energy Panel Reports on Nuclear Power Programs

94WP0086C Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English  
19 Mar 94 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Mar. 18 (PTI)—A standing parliamentary committee on energy today said that India has "not isolated" itself from the other nuclear countries of the world, though it remains a non-signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

In its fourth report on nuclear plant safety and spent fuel management, tabled in Parliament today by its chairman Mr Jaswant Singh, the committee said that despite the imposition of technology control regimes in force, India holds the status of a developed country in the field of nuclear science and technology.

Besides, India's willingness to share its experience with others bears testimony to the transparency programmes, even as India often keeps reminding members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that promotion of peaceful applications of atomic energy is its primary goal.

The committee finds that India enjoys international reputation as a 'developed' country in the field of nuclear science and technology. Safety standards in Indian nuclear reactors follow global standards and their safety is constantly monitored by the atomic energy regulatory board (AERB) which observes current international regulatory norms, it said.

Stating that India continues to be playing a prominent role among the nuclear community inspite of not signing NPT, the committee said units of the department of atomic energy (DAE) hold dynamic links with some of the leading professional international organisations dealing with peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

The committee said India has been a member of the board of governors of the IAEA since its inception and was one of the ten members considered 'most advanced' in the technology of atomic energy in the world and therefore got nominated to the board every year along with other countries such as the United States, UK, France, Russia, China, Japan, Germany, Canada, Brazil and Argentina.

Referring to the country's nuclear power programme, the committee said that the entire process of nuclear power plant design, construction, commissioning and operation is covered by a systematic quality assurance programme to provide assurances about meeting of all safety requirements.

It said India's long-term nuclear power programmes is a three-stage one and the first stage is based on pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) using indigenously available natural uranium as fuel. It said indigenously natural uranium fuel resources would sustain a nuclear power programme of 10,000 MWE in the first stage.

The second stage of the programme is based on fast breeder reactors (FRRS) using plutonium as fuel reprocessed from the spent fuel of the first stage. In this stage, with blanket material of depleted uranium, more plutonium would be bred to set up additional FRBS. Also at a later part of the second stage thorium as blanket material would breed U-233 from thorium, the committee said.

In the third stage, the programme is based on U-233 thorium-based reactor systems by which U-233 could be bred to set up a number of reactors.

The committee said that the first stage programme is not an end in itself but a route to the second stage programme of FBRS and is ultimately aimed at utilising the thorium resources.

It said India has moderate reserves of uranium whereas thorium reserves are vast. Under the circumstances and if a long-term view of energy resources is taken, it is important to push through PHWR programmes at a fast pace.

The committee has also found that for funding of nuclear power, there are no avenues for resources from overseas financial institutions, unlike in the conventional power sector.

#### Nuclear Fuel Complex To Expand, Diversify

94WP0086A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
6 Apr 94 p 11

[Text] Hyderabad, April 5—The Nuclear Fuel Complex near here, which is solely responsible for supplying fuel bundles and in-core structural components to India's nuclear power reactors, is embarking on a big expansion and diversification programme, reports UNI

More than half of the Rs 355-crore programme, including construction of new plants on the sprawling 500-hectare NFC [Nuclear Fuel Complex] campus at Moula Ali near here, has been completed.

With the commissioning of the new plants, the annual production of fuel bundles would be doubled to 32,000 annually by the end of 1995, the NFC chief executive, Mr K.K. Sinha, said.

The NFC now produces 16,400 fuel bundles—the most critical components of reactors—besides zirconium alloy mill products. It supplies to the country's nine operating nuclear power plants, including two each at Tarapur, Narora, Kalpakkam and Kota and one at Kakrapar.

#### Rao Dismisses Restriction of Nuclear Option

##### Addresses Army Commanders

94WP0089A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
14 Apr 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, April 13—The Prime Minister said today that any suggestion to restrict India's nuclear option would be "unacceptable and unrealistic," in view of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability and the recent proliferation of such weapons.

In an address at the opening session of the Army Commanders' Conference here, Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao said



that non-proliferation measures must be universal and non-discriminate and should include a specific time-frame.

This statement to senior Defence personnel assumes significance in the context of the U.S. pressure on India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr Rao said that India had always advocated peaceful use of nuclear energy and continued to believe that non-proliferation measures should not be selective in their application.

Speaking on allegations of human rights violations, the Prime Minister said that India's concern for the maintenance of human rights was second to none.

He claimed that those who tried to extract capital out of this issue should cease what he called their futile attempts to malign Indian security forces.

"It would amount to an insult to the concept of human rights to distort and misuse it for political exploitation and slanderous propaganda," he said. He added that of late, there had been a better understanding of India's performance and that some success had been attained in dispelling the motivated campaign against the forces.

The Pakistan-sponsored low intensity conflict in Kashmir was a major challenge to the nation, Mr Rao said.

#### Significance of Speech

94WP0089B *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English*  
16 Apr 94 p 16

[Editorial: "The Nuclear Option"]

[Text] The Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, has done well to reiterate India's policy on nuclear proliferation and emphasise that, while India is for a universal and comprehensive disarmament, suggestions to restrict India's own nuclear options are unacceptable and unrealistic in the current world and regional context. Given the recent visit of the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Mr Strobe Talbott, to New Delhi and Islamabad in pursuit of America's declared aim of "capping, reducing and eventually eliminating" nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia, it was important for the Prime Minister to tell an assembly of army commanders that India's policy would not change. Since 1988, this policy has had a specific framework in the form of the action plan by the year 2010 presented by Rajiv Gandhi to the United Nations session on disarmament. Under it, the onus for ending the nuclear arms race rests squarely on the shoulders of the big powers, and its centrepiece is an international treaty to replace the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty], which will see the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010. Things have not quite moved the way Rajiv Gandhi anticipated even after the end of the cold war and the partial elimination of the fears of a nuclear holocaust. Not only have the nuclear weapons states remained silent on the subject of the universal elimination of nuclear weapons, Britain, France and China have taken no concrete steps to join the 'big two' in reducing their nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, countries like India have come under pressure to take steps to reassure the world that they will not make nuclear weapons, despite India's proven track

record of responsible behaviour in this area. For this very reason, Mr Rao's observations are important. When the subject is nuclear proliferation, there is in any case great need for precision, especially because India's known position on the issue is one of carefully cultivated ambiguity. In this context, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee may not be wrong in pointing out that India's stand on nuclear issues is not related to Pakistan alone, but he is perhaps reading too much into the Prime Minister's statement as reported in the media. A closer reading of the official release makes it clear that Mr Rao had in mind a wider context, including areas other than Pakistan where such weapons could be found. The Prime Minister cannot but be aware of the strong feelings that the subject arouses in the country, especially since India has chosen the responsible policy of merely retaining, but not exercising, the nuclear option. Unlike other countries which depend on allies for their security, India is a self-professedly non-aligned country which must ensure its own in a world or a region which is not entirely peaceful.

#### Article Considers Successes in Nuclear Fuel Fabrication

BK1805142894 *Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi*  
10 May 94 p 7

[By Ranjit Kumar]

[Text] India has achieved remarkable success in the production of high-quality fuel used in nuclear power plants. Due to its success in this field, India will no longer be dependent on the developed countries regarding nuclear energy. This has enabled India to join a select band of countries. India has successfully tried mixed uranium oxide as fuel for the Tarapur atomic power plant. It is worth mentioning that the United States refused to supply fuel for this plant and later prevented France from supplying fuel as well. The reason given was that India has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Indian scientists, however, have now developed an alternative to the U.S. fuel enriched uranium. Now India is ready to use the indigenously developed fuel at Tarapur.

India has produced mixed uranium oxide fuel at the Advance Fuel Fabrication Center. A laboratory has also been set up to maintain the quality of mixed uranium oxide fuel. A plan has been prepared for plutonium reprocessing at the 200-megawatt pressurized heavy water reactor in Trombay. All practical aspects regarding the use of the alternative mixed uranium oxide as a fuel at Tarapur have been studied. Thus, in the nuclear power program, India has not only joined a select band of countries on the strength of its research, but additional successes achieved in the field of fuel fabrication has made it a world leader in some respects.

According to the annual report of the Department of Atomic Energy, India is successfully running the fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam. This marks the beginning of the second phase of the Indian nuclear energy program. The fuel fabricated for this fast breeder reactor is known as mixed uranium-plutonium carbide. The fuel is the total result of Indian efforts. This is the first time this fuel has been used in a fast breeder reactor. The Department of Atomic Energy is now preparing a blueprint for a

500-megawatt fast breeder test reactor using mixed uranium-plutonium carbide as a fuel.

India is now set to enter the ambitious third phase of its nuclear energy program. Under the third phase, fuel based on uranium-233 has been successfully fabricated. Encouraged by this success the Department of Atomic Energy has started working on the advanced heavy water reactor. This heavy water reactor will use thorium as fuel. The Kalpakkam fast breeder test reactor using indigenously fabricated carbide fuel has produced 10.25 megawatt of electricity on trial basis. The research and development work at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center keeps in view the future needs of the country's nuclear energy program. The outcome of the center's research has greatly boosted hopes of increasing nuclear power production. The Bhabha research program includes development of the 500-megawatt pressurized heavy water reactor and thorium-based reactor. The fabrication of fuel at the nuclear power plants itself is considered as a significant success in the direction of producing power from nuclear energy. This step will help India achieve a credible self-reliance in the field of nuclear energy. India can now escape from the pressures like the one applied by the United States for signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in return for the fuel for Tarapur.

#### **Poll Indicates Most Delhi Residents Want Nuclear Bomb**

BK1605105794 Delhi *THE PIONEER* in English  
12 May 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi—An overwhelming majority of the Capital's residents believes that the USA is pro-Pakistan, that Washington is fuelling an arms race on the sub-continent, and that India should make the nuclear bomb.

These are some of the findings of an opinion poll conducted over Tuesday and Wednesday among informed, regular readers of newspapers in New Delhi by MRAS-Burke on behalf of *THE PIONEER*.

Asked whether in their view the USA is pro-Pakistan, pro-India or neutral, a whopping 91 per cent of the respondents declared that America is pro-Pakistan. More men than women feel strongly about this. An insignificant three per cent of the respondents said that the USA is pro-India and an equally small number, four per cent, said that it is neutral.

More than four-fifths of the respondents, 84 per cent, said that India should go ahead and make the nuclear bomb. The number of people opposed to the bomb is just above a tenth of the respondents. Once again, a greater proportion of men (88 per cent) want the bomb, compared to women (74 per cent).

The poll also shows that 85 per cent of the respondents believe that America is fuelling an arms race on the sub-continent by supplying Pakistan with the F-16 air craft. Those who differ with this view comprise a minuscule 11 per cent.

As for America's attempts to force India into abandoning its missile programme, 82 per cent of the respondents said

that New Delhi should stand up and oppose Washington. Less than a fifth of them felt that India should give in to American pressure.

While the majority of the respondents felt that India was standing up to American pressures on nuclear and Kashmir related issues, they were not that sure about New Delhi resisting Washington's line on economic affairs.

For instance, while 64 per cent of the respondents said that India was standing up to America on nuclear issues, less than 50 per cent were willing to say the same about economic affairs. In fact as many as 45 per cent of the respondents felt that India has not resisted American pressures on the economic front.

The support for the Government's stand on Kashmir vis-a-vis American pressure is less than that for its stand on nuclear issues. While 58 per cent of the respondents said that New Delhi has resisted Washington's pressure tactics on Kashmir more than a third rejected this view.

Interestingly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Ms Robin Raphel's comments on Kashmir are seen as the single biggest contributor towards upsetting Indo-American relations. Next on the list is the U.S.-inspired dispute over India's missile programme, followed by America's attempt to arm-twist India at the secret London talks.

But despite their view that America is pro-Pakistan, that it is fuelling an arms race on the subcontinent and that India should resist all pressures and make the nuclear bomb, a vast majority of the respondents said that Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao should visit the U.S.

Mr Narasimha Rao's upcoming visit was endorsed by as many as 81 per cent of the respondents, compared to 17 per cent who said that he should abandon the trip. Interestingly, more women (88 per cent) endorsed the visit than men (77 per cent).

These findings are based on personal interviews with 307 men and women conducted in office complexes and residential areas, ensuring geographical spread. It was also ensured that the respondents have a monthly household income of more than Rs [rupees] 2,000 and read newspapers at least five days a week. Quotas were maintained for age, sex and income to represent all categories of people in the Capital.

#### **Need To Widen U.S. Approach Stressed**

94WP0092B Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English  
2 May 94 p 14

[Article by Jasjit Singh: "South Asian Nuclear Scene: Time for Local Initiative"]

[Text] The issue of multilateral dialogue on security (or non-proliferation, as the United States may prefer) unfortunately seems to have been compounded by the U.S. attempts to hustling India, especially by the London talks. It is all the more unfortunate because this has happened just before the Prime Minister's visit to the United States. But there is a need to take a dispassionate view of the questions involved.

The United States has been seeking a multilateral dialogue since 1991 to discuss non-proliferation in South Asia. Our

problem has been that the South Asian framework simply does not address the problems of nuclear security in our case. But the five-nation dialogue was doomed from the day Pakistan arbitrarily derailed the process by defining the agenda in terms of seeking to establish South Asia as a nuclear weapon-free zone. U.S. insistence since then to hold a five-nation dialogue has only tended to harden attitudes in India against any multilateral dialogue on non-proliferation issues.

The United States has been clearly articulating its non-proliferation objectives: it seeks to cap, reduce and eliminate nuclear capabilities in South Asia—in other words, create a nuclear weapon-free zone. This is the reason why even later variations of the five-nation dialogue continue to be deeply suspect in Indian eyes. The United States has been saying that it has no fixed agenda, but the picture at the end of the road has been clearly defined. It claims that the composition could be decided through preparatory discussions, but it seems to have strong reservations about a composition that does not stack up in favour of its goals. And the greater the U.S. pressure, the greater the Indian resistance not to give in, especially when the fundamental and vital national strategic interests of India are at stake.

#### Basic Goals

It is ironic that the basic goals of the two countries lie along parallel lines, displaced in time and scope. Our vital interests can be addressed only by a non-proliferation policy that seeks the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, while the United States wants to apply disarmament only to South Asia. We have believed that the process could be preceded by nuclear freeze and reduction in a global framework; and that this cannot be achieved in a local framework. The problem is that the U.S. aims regarding nonproliferation in South Asia, and our vital strategic interests have become increasingly irreconcilable.

The bilateral dialogues were meant to improve mutual understanding of strategic concerns. Some common ground has been found in terms of starting negotiations for a global ban on production of fissile material for weapon purposes, and more can be found in working for the comprehensive test-ban treaty. These are important building blocks for the long-term goals. But these should not be jeopardised by narrow partisan aims. The question remains whether there is any scope for a multilateral dialogue. To answer this we must look at the realities dispassionately.

The very term 'cap' assumes that the United States considers the situation in South Asia as that representing a post-proliferation stage. Its willingness to waive its own laws against clandestine weapon programmes only confirms that it accepts Pakistan's nuclear weapon status. It is, therefore, in the interest of Indians and Pakistanis, more than anyone else, to reduce the risks associated with ambiguous nuclear capabilities. This indeed is the rationale for the Indian proposals to Pakistan for no-first-use of nuclear capabilities, non-attack on population centres.

#### More Steps

Many more steps down that road are possible if Pakistan is willing to seek greater stability and reduced risks. The

United States prepared its own policies on seeking strategic stability, and could contribute constructively by agreeing to multilateral agreements that aim for strategic stability in Southern Asia. People like Mr Paul Nitze are arguing about the lack of utility and futility of U.S. nuclear responses in future scenarios. Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) have their greatest potential in a bilateral framework, but they also lend themselves to multilateral discussions and agreements, and would go a long way in achieving perhaps more than arms control measures because they circumscribe the nuclear factors. There are greater payoffs in a multilateral dialogue on peace, co-operation and security, rather than starting with non-proliferation measures on the agenda in a post-proliferation world. At the same time, the framework will have to be Asian rather than that of South Asia.

We need to be sensitive to the intrinsic risks associated with ambiguous nuclear weapon programmes; and hence the need for seeking stability. The scope for bilateral dialogue with Pakistan on nuclear issues is limited to CSBMs only, and going beyond that would be counter-productive, besides according legitimacy to a clandestine programme. The Pakistani leadership has already been emphasising that its nuclear programme is capped/frozen at 1989-90 level. This is credible since no real advantage would accrue to Pakistan in going beyond the dozen or so weapon capability it has acquired; and the additional costs would be infructuous.

For India, keeping the nuclear option open in a recessed deterrence posture is adequate. Even in the worse case scenario, the maximum capability that India would ever need is that of minimum deterrence. There is, thus, virtually no risk of an open-ended nuclear arms race in the sub-continent. As regards the uncertainty about who has the finger on the nuclear button in Pakistan, General Aslam Beg has recently confirmed that a national command authority for nuclear deterrence exists.

#### Capping Strategy

The other risk is that of nuclear weapon technology being passed on to another state by Pakistan. This problem cannot be resolved by the capping strategy. On the other hand, notwithstanding irresponsible and fictional accounts (like *Critical Mass*), it would be difficult to argue that the present situation is unstable as long as Pakistanis believe that their nuclear weapons provide them a much-needed sense of security.

At the same time, there is a need for strengthening regional peace and security. This can be enhanced by a multilateral dialogue in an Asian forum for peace. Kazakhstan has already proposed a conference on confidence-building and peace in Asia, and China has supported the idea. Iran has been emphasising the need for regional solutions through regional co-operation. The time is, therefore, ripe for providing the necessary impetus to a multilateral dialogue among the states of Asia on peace and co-operation to translate the concept of *Panchsheel* into a new co-operative security framework under the principle of "mutual and equal security."

Such a multilateral dialogue need not be a substitute for, or in contradiction of, any multilateral dialogue sought by the United States. But it would complement the fundamental

goal of seeking an improved environment through better political relations and marginalise a nuclear weapon-based approach to inter-state relations and national security. The United States would need to re-think its policy approaches, especially with regard to what it seeks in a multilateral dialogue. Non-proliferation, like disarmament, is the means to the larger end of ensuring peace and security; and it should not be interpreted as an end in itself and sought for its own sake.

### F-16's to Pakistan Justify Proliferation Stand

#### Meeting Pakistan's Challenge

94WP0087A *Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE*  
in English 18 Mar 94 p 7

[Editorial: "New Dimension to India's Security"]

[Text] While it is comforting that the position of the United Kingdom on the Kashmir issue is not far from India's, the continued double-speak on the part of the United States of America cannot but cause serious concern because of the ingredient of interference in our affairs. On top of its departure from the already accepted position of Kashmir's accession to India, the Bill Clinton administration's move to make available to Pakistan 38 F-16 deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSA) provided Islamabad agrees to a nuclear 'cap' or freeze through a so-called one-time exception to the Pressler amendment clearly shows its partisan posture. The Pressler Law bars economic and military aid since on its own assessment Islamabad possessed the nuclear bomb. It is common knowledge that the F-16 provides an effective delivery system for nuclear weapons. The External Affairs Minister, Mr Dinesh Singh's assessment that the United States is encouraging Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against this country should be regarded as a genuine concern for it adds a new dimension to the internal security of India. Pakistan already has 10 F-16s and was supposed to get 71 more when the Pressler sanctions were imposed. Eleven of the 71 aircraft were already built and paid for but Pakistan could not get them because of Pressler. Under the current proposal, if Pakistan 'caps' its nuclear weapons programme it is possible that up to 38 aircraft could be made available.

The American postures and Pakistan's hectic activity internationally, with the main thrust on false propaganda to enlist sympathy of not only the Organisation of Islamic Countries but of other western nations on the ground that India had systematically violated human rights, should make New Delhi prepare for any eventuality. And this demands not only national discipline to brave the challenge, but all political parties should also once again demonstrate that they are one in the determination to thwart the designs of United States and Pakistan. There is a suspicion that America has designs to see that an independent Kashmir can be brought under its hegemony as part of its secret plan to control the region. While such a proposition is not only unacceptable to India it is also bound to be opposed by countries like China and Iran, not to speak of other Central Asian Republics.

The immediate consequence of the supply of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan is the upsetting of the security arrangements in India and it will be forced to beef up its defences, which

may entail enormous expenditure to the point of dislocating our own developmental plans. This is one area where the nation cannot be complacent and the people should be prepared for any sacrifices that the situation demands. New Delhi would be well advised to match the mischief of Pakistan perpetrated by its Inter-Services Intelligence in a tit-for-tat manner rather than giving the impression that India is complaining from a position of weakness. By now it should be clear to the Indian Government that Pakistan understands only the language of offensive and not reason. Delhi should neither be apologetic nor go on the defensive but take effective steps to thwart Pakistan's evil designs, what with its Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, becoming increasingly desperate, probably to save her political power, and the growing opposition to her internally including from her home province of Sind. The Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, had already hinted that his government would review or reassess its defence policy to face the Pakistani challenge. And that challenge can be met only by India going nuclear, notwithstanding pressures and threats from the United States and other western powers.

### NPT Acceptance 'Unlikely'

94WP0087B *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English  
22 Mar 94 p 16

[Article by Manoj Joshi: "Shadow and Substance—India-U.S. Relations Today"]

[Excerpts] Indian-American relations seem to operate in Kondratiev cycles with an inevitableness which no amount of goodwill or diplomatic effort can influence. Even as there appear signals to suggest that the two are trying to repair the damage, that superlative fighter, the F-16, is once again set to send New Delhi's ties with Washington to a new low.

After a long winter of discontent, Indian and American relations were about to look up with the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Ms Robin Raphel, whose remarks on the accession of Kashmir to India began the downward spiral, deciding to visit India to clear the air. Her trip, though not quite in the spirit of Henry going to Canossa, is being touted as part of an effort by the Clinton administration to restore the credibility of its South Asian policy. By engaging her Indian interlocutors, it is hoped that the bad feelings about her and her boss President Bill Clinton's remarks will be ended.

### Sticks & Stones

So far New Delhi has comforted itself by the thought that words do not break bones. But it would now appear that Washington might be taking recourse to sticks and stones as well. The proposal for a "one-time" waiver of F-16 aircraft and other military equipment for Pakistan not only creates an enormous "public relations" problem for a government trying to keep its relations with Washington on an even keel, but will affect the military balance, thereby compelling a response in kind. An expenditure of \$2 billion in the next two years in purchasing military hardware would almost certainly torpedo Dr Manmohan Singh's economic reform programme, if nothing else will. [passage omitted]



It is not clear why the United States expects India to sign on the dotted line. While it has on occasion dampened Indo-Pakistani tensions arising from the Kashmir problem, it has not shown itself to be a particularly impartial or even mature actor. Having resisted the Pakistani effort to internationalise the issue in Geneva, New Delhi cannot be expected to cave in and accept an international conference to resolve the dispute. Even if the Rao government was willing, it would find its room for action circumscribed by the Parliament resolution on Kashmir.

#### Short Memories

Nor is it likely that the Rao government will be able to accept any new non-proliferation move being initiated by the Americans. Public memories tend to be short, but not short enough to forget that in the 1980s F-16s were supplied to check Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and when they failed to do so for three years American Presidents lied to Congress and the world by annually certifying that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. In any case, capping will not take into account devices and fissile material that may have been produced since 1987, when, according to Mr A.Q. Khan and, more recently, the former Pakistani army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, Pakistan first made the bomb, and now.

There is little alternative for India but to engage the United States in a dialogue even while spelling out clearly that it will not undertake policies that fall below the threshold of India's national interests, be it in Kashmir or elsewhere. On non-proliferation, the Prime Minister has already outlined India's wider concerns about Russia and China. As soon as the proposed international convention to ban the production of fissile material for weapons comes into force, India will, as its leading supporter, accept inspections of its nuclear facilities. But in asking India to do so as part of the "F-16s for capping" agreement, Washington is asking it to bear the obligations while rewarding Islamabad. It was not India but U.S. law which blocked the aircraft from going to Pakistan. Asking New Delhi to pay the price for Washington's convoluted Pakistan policy is insulting, to say the least, and no embassy or high-level visit is likely to be able to convince anyone otherwise.

#### Space Chairman on Cryogenic Engines, Satellite Plans

94WP0086B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
1 Apr 94 p 11

[Text] Bangalore, March 31—The chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Prof U.R. Rao, yesterday said that India would be getting seven Russian cryogenic engines under the re-negotiated settlement and that the first engine would arrive in India by mid-1996 and after than an engine every six months.

Speaking to reporters on the eve of his laying down office, Prof Rao said under the settlement India would get four cryogenic engines, while using the 'old option' ISRO would buy another three engines spending \$3 million.

In addition to these seven engines, India would also get two mock stages, he said.

India and Russia had re-negotiated the Rs 340-crores project and Russia had agreed to supply seven engines in

stages. ISRO had asked for an additional grant of Rs 250 crores for the project, he informed the reporters.

Denying that the Indian space programme had suffered a setback as the negotiations had run into rough weather following the United States' opposition to the transfer of technology, Prof Rao said the talks between the two countries concluded about two weeks ago and India would develop its own cryogenic engine.

Prof Rao said India had earlier ordered two engines and rounded off the agreement with a request for three more engines. The project needed seven engines including two mock ones. The deal was dropped in October. "We are moving on our own in the right direction," he said.

Stating that ISRO would like to see the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) operational at the earliest, Prof Rao said, the first GSLV using the Russian engine would be launched during 1996-97.

Prof Rao, however, denied that the scheduled visit of the Prime Minister, Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao, next month to Russia, was in connection with the cryogenic resettlement.

According to Prof Rao, instead of the old practice of designing the vehicle and then identifying industries for components' production, ISRO had been developing the technology and immediately transferring it to the identified industries for production. This, he said, would augment the development of the engines at the earliest.

The first indigenously designed cryogenic engine for the GSLV would be ready by 1998 and the test-flight would be carried out at different stages of production simultaneously to save time, he said.

Stating that the first flight would be carried out in six months, Prof Rao said the liquid hydrogen plant for the production of propellant had been commissioned and various testing facilities for the engine on production were in various stages.

As the multi-start engine was very essential these days, ISRO's efforts were now on to develop a two-start engine, he said.

Asked about his contribution to ISRO during his nearly ten-year tenure as chairman, Prof Rao said, "the achievement was not personal but that of ISRO," adding from the time when he took over ISRO's foundation was good, but subsequent planning was needed and the whole programme had to be integrated from application to satellites and launch vehicles.

As soon as the hub-station was ready, the mobile communication system would also be ready and depending on the requirement it could be marketed, he observed.

About a fall in expenditure in the development of satellite programme in the last year from Rs 64.5 crores in 1992-93 to Rs. 37.9 crores Prof Rao said every year the project changed and most of the expenditure was needed at the initial stages. However, he denied that the fall was an indication that the country's satellite front was saturated.

Prof Rao, yesterday said the second indigenously built Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle—D2 (PSLV-D2) would be launched in July/August this year.

Subsequent launches would take place every year. While the PSLV-D2 would carry an X-ray satellite apart from the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS-P2), PSLV-D2 was expected to carry a payload for studying ocean development.

According to Prof Rao, most of the hardware including three PS-1 segments, nozzle and motor interstages were already realised for flight and remaining hardware was being finished. The only work needed to be done was at the launch pad.

The 'failure analysis committee' (FAC) constituted to look into the cause of the failure of PSLV-D1 had suggested some modifications. The FAC had confirmed that all major systems integrated in PSLV-D1 had worked as planned and there was no serious defect in the design of the vehicle, he said.

However, according to Prof Rao, the FAC had confirmed that the failure of the PSLV-D1 in reaching the intended orbit was primarily due to a software error in the pitch control loop of the on-board guidance and control processor. But for this, the PSLV-D1 would have reached its orbit, the FAC confirmed.

Further, Prof Rao said the fourth developmental launch of the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) would be by the end of April or first week of May to place a 115 kg payload in a circular orbit of 400 km. It is already on the launch pad.

#### Items of 'Sensitive Nature' for Sale

94WP0088B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
12 Apr 94 pp 1, 9

[Article by Dinesh Kumar: "Advertisement Smacks of Scam"]

[Text] New Delhi, April 11—An advertisement placed by the defence ministry in specialised national and international aviation journals inviting global tenders for sale of certain Indian Air Force equipment has left a trail of unanswered questions, hinting even at a possible scandal.

Among the listed items in the advertisement placed by the Special Surplus Stores Disposal Committee (SSSDC) of the Ministry of Defence are approximately one lakh pairs of blue grey winter uniforms comprising trousers and tunics with belts and brass buckles. Surprisingly, all these uniforms are stated to be in an absolutely new and unused condition of various sizes.

Enquiries, however, reveal that the number is much more. The figures of these winter uniforms are in fact 94,000 full pairs (tunics and trousers) and 38,000 tunics.

The other items, which indeed are of sensitive nature, are 161 lines comprising electronic equipment for the Russian made Surface to Air (SAM-II) missiles guidance system, 126 serviceable missiles, 35 SAM-II launchers, and missile liquid propellants—namely 92 litres of "O" fuel (nitric acid), 53,124 litres of "G" fuel and 20,785 litres of IPN [expansion not given].

The "O" and "G" fuels are used in the Intermediate Range 'Agni' and surface to air Prithvi missile programmes. It is not clear whether the IAF [Indian Air Force] has applied its mind to the possible violation of the country's policy of

not exporting missile technology or materials. As a senior IAF officer pointed out, "This could well tantamount to adding to proliferation of such dangerous and sensitive equipment," adding "how can we be sure that it won't unwittingly end up in Pakistani hands. After all it is a global tender and the Pakistanis can buy it, if not directly, through indirect means."

Among the miscellaneous aircraft spares are 596 line items of the U.S. origin B-24 Liberator bomber aircraft which interestingly was phased out of the IAF in the mid-1960s. Among the 10 AN-12 transport aircraft put up for sale are two such aircraft which have flown just 171 and 671 hours each after their last overhaul. But then this compares better with the 140 indigenously developed HE-24 Marut ground attack aircraft which was sold as scrap in the early 1980s.

Of these 140 Maruts, 40 of them had flown just 20 hours each. Rather than have further developed on the HF-24, which had cost the IAF Rs 69 lakh a piece, its replacement in the form of the British Aerospace manufactured Jaguar had then cost the state exchequer Rs 8 crore a piece. Today the price per piece of the Jaguar is over Rs 60 crore.

What has raised special interest in defence circles is the large number of winter uniforms in new and unused condition. While the Royal Air Force (RAF) of Britain has never changed its uniform since its inception, changes have been introduced into the IAF uniforms by almost every air chief. However, generally speaking, the IAF which provides free uniforms to the 75,000 to 80,000 airmen, allows for a long changeover period in order to ensure complete and proper utilisation of its stocks. On the other hand IAF officers are not provided free uniforms and are instead entitled to a uniform allowance of Rs 3,000 every seven years.

When contacted an official spokesman of the IAF said that the uniforms in question were up to 34 years old dating back to 1960 and had been accumulated over a period of time. Enquiries with the SSSDC, however, revealed that the uniforms were up to 18 years old.

But there is no convincing answer as to how and why such a large number of uniforms have been lying, to quote the advertisement, in a "new" and "unused" condition for so many years. Does it not amount to an unnecessary loss to the state exchequer?

#### New Radar To Ensure Safe Rocket Launchings

94WP0090A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English  
27 Apr 94 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, April 26—Research in atmospheric science has received a boost with the commissioning of a unique radar at Gadanki near Tirupati, which will also ensure safe rocket launchings from Sriharikota, launched 80 km away, reports PTI.

With this new facility, Indian scientists will be able to make a detailed study of lower and middle atmospheres and also the region of the ionosphere above 100 km, according to Dr P. Balarama Rao, director of this radar facility.

A link-up of this radar with control room at Sri Harikota will enable space scientists to watch out for turbulence and wind shears before a rocket is launched.

Called Mesosphere-Stratosphere-Troposphere Radar, the Rs 100 million-facility has been established jointly by five different agencies, including, space and defence departments.

It consists of a 1024 computer-controlled antenna, arranged in 32 rows, whose powerful beam at 53 megahertz frequency can be aimed at six pre-set directions.

Echoes received from the atmosphere are analysed by a computer, giving almost instantaneous readings of wind speeds at different heights.

Atmospheric scientists all over India will have access to this MST radar, said to be one of the very few in the world, and perhaps the only radar close to the Equator, where the atmospheric processes are quite different from those at higher latitudes.

According to Dr Balarama Rao, the radar will have applications ranging from short-term weather forecasting to long-term vertical transports of trace elements. It will measure vertical wind speeds that cannot be measured from any other technique.

Dr Rao said the radar also provided Indians the unique opportunity to observe "gravity waves" generated by tropical jet streams, storms, and interaction of strong winds with large mountains.

The radar will take only a minute or two to detect wind shears and turbulences that could pose hazards to rockets in flight.

#### **Lok Sabha Told Achievements in Satellite Launching**

94WP0090C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
28 Apr 94 p 7

[Excerpt] New Delhi, Apr. 27 (PTI)—India is likely to emerge as a major space power by the turn of the century and would achieve self-sufficiency in satellite launch vehicle technology by then, the Lok Sabha was told today.

India had emerged as a major space power in satellite building and space applications in the areas of communication, meteorology, disaster warning and remote sensing, the minister of state in Prime Minister's Office, Mr Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi, said in a written reply.

With two operational space systems, Indian national satellite (INSAT) and the Indian remote sensing satellite (IRS), the country had demonstrated its technological capabilities in these areas, he said.

India had already developed technological capabilities to launch 1000 kg IRS class, satellite through design, development and testing of polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV), Mr Chaturvedi said.

The development and operationalisation of geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) before the end of the century, will make India self-sufficient in satellite launch vehicle technology, he said.

The minister also said there was no proposal to shut down any of the Trombay nuclear research reactors.

However, the Apsara and Cirus research reactors were planned to be refurbished in view of their long service life of about 38 years and 34 years, respectively, he added. [passage omitted]

#### **Concern Expressed Over Intent of London Talks**

##### **Confused Responses**

94WP0091A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
29 Apr 94 pp 1, 11

[Article by Manoj Joshi: "Rao Trying To Please Both Sides?"]

[Text] New Delhi, April 28—The government's confused and even contradictory response to the London talks underscores the dilemma of the Prime Minister, Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao. Sources in the external affairs ministry say that in his one-to-one discussions with Mr Strobe Talbott, he conceded the U.S. demand for a multi-lateral conference. However, U.S. counterparts are claiming that the Prime Minister was quite definite in his commitment while Indian officials claim that the acceptance was conditional, the composition, agenda and modalities only being thrashed out now in the secret talks, now public knowledge.

Most observers accept that Mr Rao will knowingly never do anything against the country's interests, but many of them feel that the Prime Minister is attempting to undertake the near-impossible task of finessing a policy that will satisfy both the United States and Indian interests. The talks in London, the changed composition of the delegation indicate that Mr Rao thinks he can pull it off.

One section of the government believes that Mr Krishnan's brief is to stall for time and draw out the United States in discussions on modalities, composition and so on, and allow the Prime Minister to complete his U.S. visit.

However, another segment of the bureaucracy advocates caution, arguing that the U.S. does not function in this manner and will certainly obtain clear-cut Indian commitments before Mr Rao reaches Washington, so as to make the Indian Prime Minister's visit a substantive one from President Bill Clinton's side. Mr Clinton will then be able to tell the U.S. Congress that notwithstanding failures on other foreign policy fronts, India and Pakistan have been brought around to accept the U.S. non-proliferation agenda.

It may be recalled that in similar circumstances, in October 1987, the United States had brought pressure to bear upon India to accept port calls from U.S. Navy ships involved in coercing Iran.

A few weeks prior to Rajiv Gandhi's American visit, the United States requested the visit of the *USS Enterprise* to Bombay. But when this was turned down on grounds that it went against India's policy of allowing ships carrying nuclear arms into Indian ports, the United States modified its request asking that only the cruise missile armed *USS Missouri* be permitted. When this too was turned down on similar grounds, the United States sent two other frigates,

which in their own way began the process that ended in the Indo-U.S. joint naval exercise in 1992.

On second thoughts, the 'secret' talks between India and the United States in London to decide, "the concept and agenda" for the multilateral talks on disarmament, appear even more curious. Yesterday in Parliament, the minister of state for external affairs, Mr R.L. Bhatia told the Lok Sabha that this was the fourth round of bilateral official talks between India and the United States. However, the official spokesman declared that it was only "another round of bilateral discussions."

In response to a question, U.S. officials in New Delhi accepted that these were indeed official talks, but made it clear that they wished to "stay away from the numbers game," and refrained from commenting on whether this was the "fourth," or just "another" round of talks. This coyness conceals more substantive issues.

The three rounds of bilateral talks between India and the United States in February and May 1992 and September 1993—were between two equal parties discussing security and strategic issues. The London "secret" talks are a spin-off of these talks, which seek to create a multilateral format to resolve the South Asian "problem," by capping and eliminating India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. Here these two countries come under one category of "problem" states and the others—the United States, U.K., France, Russia, China, Japan and Germany—will be the guarantors of the Indo-Pakistani capping agreement. Needless to say, this goes not only against the grain of not just stated policy, but also Indian security interests.

United States' officials are being quite careful to note that not only are the talks official, since they are being conducted by U.S. officials like the deputy assistant secretary of state, Mr Robert Einhorn and Mr Norman Wulff, the acting assistant director of the non-proliferation bureau, but their presence together means that the key requirement of inter-agency consultation has been met.

In our case, such subtleties do not matter. There appears to have been no effort to consult the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence, leave alone the Ministry of External Affairs. Even more curious is the status of the leader of the Indian delegation. "Distinguished," "senior" and "experienced" are the adjectives being used to describe this former diplomat, but they cannot hide the fact that he is a retired official and is thus not quite accountable for his views or conduct to the government.

While the official spokesman says that such appointments are the prerogative of the government and that Mr Krishnan enjoys its confidence, it still does not answer all the queries about his mandate and status as well as the manner in which serving officials accompanying him are to deal with him.

Had he been given the status of a special envoy, such questions need not have risen. But then, it is clear by now, that the entire episode has been shoddily handled by the government that pointing to one issue is of little consequence.

### Sense of Disquiet

94W0091B Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English  
28 Apr 94 p 13

[Article by Manoj Joshi: "A Growing Sense of Disquiet"]

[Text] New Delhi, April 27—During the Talbott visit to the subcontinent earlier this month, U.S. officials candidly accepted that the "Pakistan track" of their programme to eliminate nuclear and missile capability in South Asia was the "F-16s for capping" arrangement. But they claimed that they had not quite formulated what they had in mind for India.

It would appear now, looking at the composition of the Indian delegation, that the London "secret" talks are being used to discuss the "India Track" of the U.S. plan.

Also not merely some "principles" or modalities for a multilateral conference to eliminate strategic weapons capabilities in South Asia. The presence of Ms Meera Shankar, commercial attache in Washington and Mr K. Santhanam, Chief Adviser Technology in the DRDO [Defense Research Development Organization] dealing with Indo-U.S. technology transfer issues suggests that the talks will also take up India's taking "interim" steps to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, maintaining its cap on its Agni development, as well as desisting from deploying the Prithvi missile system in exchange for some commercial and technology transfer incentives.

The government's decision to use a retired diplomat, Mr N. Krishnan to hold the fourth round of the Indo-U.S. dialogue on capping India's self-defence capability in "secret," and that too in a third country—UK—appears to defy commonsense and logic. Depending on the point of view, it appears either redundant or ominous. Not surprisingly, it has raised a storm of protest in Parliament. The composition of the delegation appears to be an effort by the senior-most bureaucrat in the Prime Minister's office (PMO) to bypass the established official channel through the Ministry of External Affairs. But even the choice of the leader of the delegation appears questionable.

Mr Krishnan is a distinguished diplomat who has served the country in a number of important and challenging assignments. But he also has, according to many of his former colleagues, strong and not-so-secret views in favour of India signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, something which the government is even now saying it is opposed to.

Ever since the Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao's meeting with President Bush in New York in early 1992, India has been committed to a dialogue with the United States on the nuclear weapons issue.

The United States has made it clear that it would like to see the elimination of strategic weapons capability in South Asia, i.e., ending India's unexercised option to make nuclear weapons and its research and development programme for missiles. India has, however, till now insisted that this policy is unrealistic since it did not take into account India's wider security concerns, viz. China.

Since March 1992, three rounds of dialogue have been held till now with teams led by senior foreign ministry officials. So why the change for the fourth round?



No clear explanation is available. The public relations mills at the PMO claim that the MEA [expansion not given] was not executing the Prime Minister's policy efficiently. Some suspicions that there may be more than just alleged MEA incompetence emerged from the dismantling of the team set up by the former foreign secretary, Mr J.N. Dixit, in his ministry to focus on the dialogue. Some clues are now available from the composition of the delegation to London.

The presence of Mr Satish Chandra, India's permanent representative at Geneva is a fig leaf that cannot hide the lack of a substantive MEA representation in the talks considering that the first three rounds have been coordinated by them.

Mr Rakesh Sood, Director disarmament had to be included in the team since he is, at present, the only official familiar with various Indian negotiation stances at various bilateral and multilateral fora on disarmament issues.

The presence of two other persons as well as the leader has, as has been noted, provided an ample inkling to the nature of the dialogue.

But whether this is good for India or not, that it can do anything is another aspect. India has no institutional arrangements such as a national security council to decide on the issues. So policy has been made whimsically.

As it is there is now a growing sense of disquiet among senior civil servants as well as armed forces officers at the recent directions in India's security policies and the "extra-constitutional" role being played by some elements in the PMO in formulating them. Not unlike Europe, the nuclear and missile capabilities in South Asia have stabilised the regional situation notwithstanding the Kashmir rebellion.

Ironically, the "secret" talks are likely to increase Islamabad's sense of unease rather than the other way around since there is a belief there, conditioned by its perceptions of New Delhi, that the improved tenor [as printed] of Indo-U.S. relations is directed against Pakistan. There is some question as to whether the United States knows what it is doing and, perhaps more germane, whether India does.

#### Openness Urged

94WP0091C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
28 Apr 94 p 12

[Editorial: "Mysterious Meeting"]

[Text] The misgivings caused by the reports about the capping of the Agni programme, which were not entirely removed by the Prime Minister's denial in Parliament, are likely to be strengthened by the proposed "secret" Indo-U.S. parleys on security issues in London. Coming as they do in the wake of the Strobe Talbott visit one of whose main objectives was to persuade India and Pakistan to take a fresh look at their security perceptions, these developments are bound to raise questions and even fuel suspicions about a greater and more direct American involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent than has been the case in the recent past. This is all the more so because the United States is known to be unhappy about India's efforts to attain self-sufficiency in missile technology, as its embargo on the supply of Russian cryogenic rockets

showed. Washington would also like India to be more receptive towards its plan for a nuclear-free South Asia. One of the purposes of the proposed multilateral conference on disarmament will be to discuss this very issue, notwithstanding India's long-held contention that non-nuclear pockets are meaningless when a selected group of countries are allowed to retain their deadly arsenal. It may well be that the London meeting will deal with some of these problems. But what is not a little disturbing is the unusual emphasis on secrecy placed by the Indian government on the conference.

Subsequent clarifications that this was the fourth meeting in a series and a prelude to the Washington summit between Mr Narasimha Rao and Mr Clinton are unlikely to be fully convincing. Moreover, the inclusion of a retired diplomat known for his preference for the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] will be considered significant. It is, of course, up to the government to choose its team, but what is nevertheless necessary is that there should be an element of transparency in the entire exercise. Even if it is granted that diplomatic exchanges cannot be conducted in a market place, the government must still inform Parliament about what is being discussed with a country which not long ago had irked many people in India with its needlessly provocative attitude towards a complex and sensitive issue like Kashmir. There is also a need to reiterate India's position on some of the contentious issues if only to make it abundantly clear that there will be no compromises on matters crucial to Indian security. Since our concerns relate not to Pakistan alone, the government will do well to pay heed to what the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leaders said in Parliament about the "trap" into which India may walk at the five plus two plus two conference. The point the opposition members made about the holding of the latest meeting in a third country is also relevant, for it suggests that neither government wanted too close a monitoring of the discussions. However, such a calculation is a naive one in this age of instant communications. So New Delhi will be well advised to shed its attitude of secrecy and be more open about the talks.

#### Official Views Development of Agni Missile Program

BK1305015594 Delhi DAINIK JAGRAN in Hindi  
10 May 94 p 1,11

[Text] Bangalore 9 May—Efforts are being made to increase the strike range of the country's most sophisticated weapon 'Agni' [long range surface-to-surface missile]. At present its range is limited to 1,500 km. Agni's shape may also be changed.

Dr. A.N. Agarwal, director of the Agni program, gave this information while addressing a function organized by the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. He revealed that there will be no change in the warhead which at present is capable of carrying one tonne of explosives. However, efforts are being made to increase the payload capacity during the third stage of the missile development, but it has no connection with the warhead load.

Dr. Agarwal said that the first successful flight of the missile proved that India has been able to acquire the

technology of the 10-tonne G [as published] missile type. The later flights proved that the reentry payload can hit the smallest of targets.

What after Agni? Replying to the question, Dr. Agarwal said that we are further refining the latest system of flight data analyses.

Dr. Agarwal said that the Indian missile program has emerged from many pressures. This has given recognition to India in this field. He said that most of the modern missile techniques are controlled by very few countries. India has developed the technique from indigenous technology and available limited facilities at its own institutes and with the help of its own scientists.

He said that the country's young scientists have taken up the new challenges. Equipment banned under the Missile Technology Control regime are being developed. He assured that the country will make rapid progress in this field in future.

On the subject of missile technology development, Dr. Agarwal said this was a small program due to which the country can now sit and talk with the superpowers on an equal basis. He said the developed nations are stubborn in this connection and they do not even want to give an ordinary database technique to developing nations.

About research work being done in different fields, he said India will become strong technologically and economically in next 20 to 25 years.

#### **Government Denies Reports on Missile Test Postponement**

*BK0905114194 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0830 GMT 9 May 94*

[Text] The government today categorically denied in the Rajya Sabha reports appearing in a section of the press about the Prime Minister's Office [PMO] stalling the Prithvi [missile] test. The minister of state for parliamentary affairs, Mrs. Margaret Alva, pointed out that these reports have been already refuted by the PMO. She said the prime minister has also clarified the matter in parliament. Mrs. Alva has said that the prime minister has already discussed with the opposition leaders, including the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leader, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, on his forthcoming visit to the United States. Earlier, the leader of the opposition in the house, Mr. Sikander Bakht, demanded a statement from the prime minister on the reports appearing in a daily alleging that the government has called off the 13th Prithvi test.

#### **Tanks Get Advanced Fire, Explosion Suppression System**

*BK1605102994 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0830 GMT 16 May 94*

[Text] The Defense Institute for Fire Research in New Delhi has developed a fire fighting system that can detect and put out fires in less than one-fourth of a second. The director of the institute, Major General B.S. Kataria, said the automatic fire and explosion suppression system, as it is called, has been fitted on the MBT [Main Battle Tank]-Arjun tank and is to be fitted also on the T-72 tanks. He said this fire fighting system has been integrated with

another system to alert the tank crew in the event of a nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. The fire protection system can also be fitted in ships and armored personnel carriers.

### **IRAQ**

#### **Regime Reportedly Uses Napalm Bombs in Attack on North**

*NC1505165494 (Clandestine) Voice of the People of Kurdistan in Arabic 1600 GMT 15 May 94*

[Text] The Kurdistan office of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SAIRI] has stated that an armored brigade of the Iraqi regime has launched a major offensive against a number of villages in the Dhi Qar Governorate.

A statement issued by the office said that the regime's artillery bombarded [words indistinct]. SAIRI sources said that the regime used napalm bombs in the attack.

### **PAKISTAN**

#### **Editorial Condemns U.S. Official's 'Threat' of Force**

*BK1005131994 Lahore JANG in Urdu 10 May 94 p 3*

[Editorial: "The U.S. Threat To Use Force"]

[Text] The U.S. secretary of the Army has threatened that if certain countries do not abandon their nuclear programs, the United States will use force to terminate their programs. Addressing special centenary celebrations for the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, he said that some countries have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. The United States is trying to persuade them in a friendly manner, but it will not refrain from using force if these efforts fail. Ejazul Haq, a former Pakistani minister and member of the National Assembly who was present at the function, told JANG's special correspondent that although the secretary did not mention Pakistan in his speech, it was obvious that he was referring to us. This is because he addressed Ejazul Haq in particular before mentioning the threat to use force and excused himself to Haq when he did mention it.

The United States is keenly interested in nuclear nonproliferation. It is no secret that it is striving to realize this objective throughout the world. It is also evident, though, that the U.S. campaign against nuclear weapons is neither equitable nor impartial. It has no objection to certain countries' nuclear programs and is indirectly assisting and supporting the advancement and success of their programs. The most conspicuous example is Israel.

Informed sources are aware that Israel not only has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, it also has a huge stockpile of such weapons. Despite knowing this, the United States has never expressed any concern about Israel's nuclear capability or threatened Israel. On the contrary, Israel tops the list of countries receiving U.S. foreign aid. The two countries have pursued very close and longstanding technical cooperation. It would not be incorrect to say that the United States and Israel are two bodies sharing a single heart. It is also no secret why the United

States has been ignoring the Israeli nuclear program. The United States considers Israel its closest ally in the Middle East, like a virtual state of the United States, and is deeply interested in accelerating its defense and nuclear capabilities.

Similarly, although the United States keeps protesting against the Indian nuclear program, it has never adopted a tough stand against the increase in India's nuclear capability, as it has with Pakistan or North Korea. In fact, there were occasions when the United States—through France—indirectly helped India continue its nuclear program. Given the circumstances, the U.S. threat to use force against Pakistan is very regrettable and deserves to be condemned. This attitude is all the more amazing in view of the fact that Pakistan has already made some very rational and just proposals for winding up its nuclear program. Pakistan has proposed that the Indian Ocean be made a nuclear-free zone. Pakistan has expressed its readiness to open its nuclear installations for international inspection on the condition that India does the same.

Pakistan has also expressed its willingness to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provided that India does as well. India has not made any positive response to these rational and practical proposals. The logical next step would have been for the United States and the Western powers to exert pressure on India to achieve the goal of nuclear nonproliferation. Even if we acknowledge that such pressure was exerted, we cannot deny it was done in a half-hearted manner.

During U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's recent visit to Pakistan, Pakistan expressed its willingness to implement any just proposal on nuclear nonproliferation. The Indian response, on the other hand, was disappointing. Under the circumstances, the U.S. secretary's threat of using force against Pakistan is incomprehensible and extremely regrettable. We are fully confident that despite the U.S. secretary's threat, Pakistan will adhere to its principled stand and that the United States will not succeed in bullying this country. It is inappropriate for the United States to use such language.

Certain quarters of the Pakistani Government are overly optimistic that a way can be found to provide limited defense aid to Pakistan despite the Pressler Amendment. The latest pronouncement by the U.S. secretary of the Army should be enough of an eye opener. The Pakistani Government should seriously make every possible effort to meet its defense needs through non-American sources. Also, the government should obtain the text of the secretary's speech, examine its implications, and lodge a protest with the U.S. Government if warranted.

#### **Top Scientist Views Nuclear Program**

BK1405125494 Islamabad *THE NATION* in English  
14 May 94 pp 1,4

[Text] Lahore—Pakistan's atomic scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan has said that Pakistan has rejected unilateral pressure on its nuclear programme. Through argumentation, it has got the pressure released to some extent and now some pressure has been diverted to India too which was not the case before.

Talking to *THE NATION* and *NAWA-I-WAQT* on Friday, he said by the grace of God "we are fully capable of defending the country and military-wise our country is in strong hands. In this connection, no one should have any misunderstanding, nor does anyone need to worry about that."

Commenting, he said the present government has realised the importance of defence and has provided the required funds. Both the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff are fully aware of the situation. That is why, no cut has been made in the defence budgetary allocations. He said if need be "we are ready to ask the nation for donations for country's defence."

Emphasising unity, he said it strengthens the defence. But the nation is not united to the extent it should be. There are two methods of getting the defence strengthened: first, to increase the military capability and, second, by increasing friends at diplomatic and political levels. "Sometimes you achieve a goal diplomatically which is difficult militarily or otherwise." However, he said, one cannot deny the importance of military might. "This is because you have more friends when you are powerful and the country which is weak economically and militarily cannot make many friends."

He said the present political situation demands that "we get united". National unity is very important he repeated. No country can endeavour to establish peace single-handedly as this is the responsibility of all the countries of the region. Whichever proposals Pakistan has given for peace have been appreciated by all the countries, Iran, China and even the U.S. has declared it a positive approach. But India has not liked these suggestions, he added. "If India does not like our proposals, it should give its own." India should bring its proposals at the negotiating table, he said, adding that "we want permanent peace in the region as much as does someone else."

He said the impression that "we the atomic scientists are against peace is wrong." Any general or atomic scientist loves peace as much as others do.

Coming to the Kashmir issue, he said Pakistan wants peaceful solution to the issue. Pakistan has given some proposals for establishment of peace in the region and now it is the duty of India to respond positively.

Answering a question on Kalabagh Dam, he said the apprehensions and fears which some people have must be addressed. Changes in the designs of the project and other such matters [word indistinct] introduced with the consent of all the concerned, but this matter should not be politicised. Those having objections to the plan should make their objections clear and those who are responsible to remove these should do that.

He said instead of politicians the debate on this project should be given to the experts. Besides, no hurdles should be created in this plan. He said it is generally believed that this dam should not be built, for it would result in some loss. Whereas the other opinion is that this plan is very much in the nation's interest and, accordingly, it should be started at the earliest.

He said when a big project is started, some people do get affected. The construction of Tarbela and Mangla Dams

also affected many but it also benefited the entire nation. The government paid the compensation to the affectees.

He said the power crisis can be overcome by setting up nuclear power stations. He revealed that fresh round of talks between Pakistan and France on atomic power plant is about to commence. France promised to give Pakistan that plant. Later on, it did not fulfil its promise due to certain reasons, "I think we have the right to get that plant and I hope negotiations would start soon which would prove useful."

He said there is no denying the fact that there was much pressure in the past as regards its peaceful nuclear programme. But the stance of Pakistan has forced those pressurising elements to see the reality, Pakistan has always adopted the stance that it should not be discriminated against as far as the atomic programme is concerned. Rather both Pakistan and India should be treated alike.

Further, Pakistan's proposal to declare South Asia nuclear-free region was appreciated by all with the sole exception of India. Pakistan has clearly stated that it favours nuclear proliferation. [sentence as published] But this is something Pakistan cannot do alone. If this aim is to be achieved, India too would have to be convinced.

He said Pakistan rejected any unity lateral pressure on it because of which the supply of F-16s has been suspended although Pakistan has paid for the aircraft. Even then Pakistan did not compromise on its national defence. "Had we compromised, the aircraft would not have been withheld and supply of other military aid too would have started again. We think the present government has got the pressure released through its logics and now some pressure has been diverted to India."

He said getting any country's atomic programme frozen and linking it with foreign aid can in no way be declared in line with the UN Charter or international demands. Every country has the right to utilise all its resources to ensure its

defence. However, if a formula is chalked out to ensure international peace, it should be applied to all the countries without any discrimination.

India increased its defence budget. It is a big country. What danger does it have? It has no threat from any other country. It has increased its defence budget only to establish its regional supremacy. But the old ideas to establish supremacy have died out as even small states can make their defence strong against big countries.

He said Benazir Bhutto and COAS [Chief of Army Staff] Gen Abdul Waheed are fully aware of the situation. That is why, no cuts have been made in the budgetary allocations for defence. Had India reduced its defence budget, Pakistan too had an option.

The attitude of the government, its foreign policy, the steps it took as regards Kashmir and the decisions taken by the political and military leadership are correct. He, however, said the present steps being taken for the scientific and technological development are not enough. "We have to do much more in this connection."

Dr Qadeer observed the energy crisis has not surfaced overnight. There are many reasons behind them. As such, it cannot be overcome overnight. Particularly the economic and energy crises cannot be redressed overnight.

The common man thinks about what the previous governments have done in this regard. Had some concrete steps been taken at the very outset, the situation would have been different. It's a good sign that the present government had initiated some plans for energy. But energy crisis would take some time.

He said even the Ministers do not want to take the portfolios of Science and Technology. "This shows how much interest we take in this field. Fund collection is no problem." Like other benefit shows, one can be arranged to better the economic conditions of the country too, he concluded.



## RUSSIA

### Strategist Views Russian Nuclear Potential

PM0605121594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 5 May 94 p 6

[Part one of two-part article by Vasily Krivokhizha, deputy director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research: "Future of Russian Nuclear Potential"]

[Text] The Soviet leadership's political thinking, particularly as regards military-political strategy, used to be compared in the old days to studied chess gambits. The circumstances of the USSR's collapse and the rapid degradation of society call into question the correctness of this complimentary comparison—at any rate as regards the skills of many of the "chess players" of the perestroika period. The historians of the future, however, will as usual voice varying opinions about 20th century Russian history and about whether the last Soviet leadership had an inferiority complex or whether they were pioneering a new era, and so forth. What will be seen as history by the researchers of the future, for us increasingly boils down to the problem of survival. Consequently, as we encounter very urgent matters every day it does not seem out of place to attempt to sort out at least certain rules and the sense of the game in which Russia is a player in the nuclear arms sphere.

The current era of total change is, apart from anything else, also a time of radical change in geostrategic realities and ways of thinking. The speed and spontaneity of these changes are probably the reason why our so-called post-Soviet society is parting willingly (and even with unmitigated enthusiasm) from the state appurtenances that largely determined the USSR's status as a military "superpower." There is something irrational—though easily explained in terms of the systemic crisis in society and its revolutionary nihilism—in the fact that we are putting paid with equal measures of indifference ("we don't need that any more!") to the, in many respects controversial but nonetheless technically sophisticated, "Buran" (and thus, in practice, to our entire "state-funded space effort"); to aircraft-carrying cruisers—and next it will be the turn of the entire oceangoing fleet; and to ABM defense and air-defense installations and strategic ground force groupings west of Smolensk and south of Sochi.

There is, however, a sphere of social and professional interests where the consequences of the possible changes should be analyzed with particular care and where discussions should be conducted by specialists in a constructive spirit without any interference from emotions and not necessarily in conjunction with other information such as, say, the examination of the START II Treaty by the new parliament or the adoption of a long-term program for military organizational development. It will be a question of the prospects for developing our strategic nuclear forces, which can quite justifiably be called the scepter in the double-headed eagle's claw.

It is time to recognize that behind the numerous discussions about the expediency of retaining, removing, or adopting certain weapons systems and their quantitative and qualitative parameters lies a principled and so fundamental question that people prefer not to consider it—will

Russia be able under these conditions that are new to it to preserve its nuclear potential and in what form? It is no secret that a number of important components in the nuclear system that used to exist have been lost, and traditional problems such as, for instance, the no-first-use of nuclear weapons and the relationship between a retaliatory strike and a counterstrike are being reconsidered and reinterpreted. Thus, the question of the future of Russia's nuclear potential is becoming not so much theoretical as practical—particularly now that the lack of funds and the absence of constant and focused attention from top organs of power to the problems of the strategic nuclear forces could lead to their irreversible degradation. In tandem with this, the protracted uncertainty about ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) threatens to seriously delay the entire future disarmament process and introduces additional problems to the choice of the ideal solutions for modernizing the Russian Armed Forces' strategic nuclear component.

Statesmen who should already be taking responsible steps to choose long-term avenues for the organizational development of nuclear strategic forces are feeling an urgent need for a more accurate system of references in the emerging geopolitical situation, a need to understand what global military-political situation they will have to face in the future. And it is very important for them that some fragments of the picture of the future—despite the turbulent processes of change in the world order—are in a number of aspects acquiring new outlines.

A typical feature of the emergent era will be a change in the overall structure of influence in the world. Many specialists are noting that the bipolar structure with two opposed superpowers—the United States and the USSR—is being replaced by a more traditional multipolar structure which, by reducing the opportunities for the superpowers to determine the course of world development, will enhance the role of other countries (such as the countries of Europe and the Pacific region), diversifying the arsenal of their ways and means of influencing world politics. According to a number of forecasts, the weakening of U.S. economic positions in favor of West Europe and Japan will make the United States' bonds of alliance with its partners in Europe and Asia more short-term and unstable, and international relations more complex, unstable, and less predictable as a result. Hence, the overall political situation in the world may be less predictable, hard to control even at regional, not to mention global, level, and likely to result in the emergence of acute crises and the appearance of additional spurs to confrontation. The distant rumbles of thunder can already be heard.

In the context of a multipolar world with criteria of influence and stability that are somewhat different and by no means always advantageous for Russia, when additional room is created for multilateral political maneuver, allies can very quickly become enemies, and the principle of "every man for himself" (remembering G. Washington's behest) prevails increasingly clearly in politics—under these circumstances it is hardly sensible to rush into all-out disarmament, giving up our national nuclear forces or even discussing handing them over to some kind of collective control. It would be an unforgivable mistake, giving in to complacent ideas about the end of the era of confrontation,

to "tear the tails off" all Russia's strategic missiles, although this does not at all mean that we should not use the entire panoply of peaceful means of safeguarding Russia's national security or that we should end the disarmament negotiations.

The range of opinions on this issue, particularly now that politics has become part and parcel of our public awareness, is quite broad. Thus, there is a view (voiced in particular by ISKRAN [expansion unknown] staffers S.K. Oznobishchev and A.V. Surikov) that at a time of the transition to the building of strategic partnership relations between Russia and the United States, the use of the strategic stability criteria which were successfully used in the postwar decades is becoming senseless. Since this is the case, despite all the reservations befitting the current situation, nuclear weapons are allegedly becoming a kind of burden for Russia and should be gradually turned into the "last guarantee" of the security system "not only for Russia and the United States in isolation, but perhaps for a whole group of states united behind the principles of a collective security system within the UN framework."

Admittedly, it seems as though the United States is not yet ready to share with Russia its experience of these innovations, even though their general human and humanitarian thrust is evident. The nuclear powers' lack of enthusiasm on this subject is possibly explained by the fact that achieving an ideal combination of individual and collective means of defense is a complicated task with no single solution. But that is a separate discussion. The actual agenda is different, and one specific problem is that Russia should maintain effective national strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, it somehow seems as though our enemy now is not any specific country or group of countries, but uncertainty (incidentally, the transition to planning for uncertainty has already been reflected in some official U.S. documents on military-strategic issues).

If we set out the development of military thinking in the nuclear planning sphere extremely simply and without any serious distortions, it can be said that the development of nuclear weapons arsenals has made certain changes to the targeted role of military strategy, which has become more broadly interpreted and is seen as a military-political strategy. In reality this has meant a change of emphasis in nuclear planning from the possibility of directly winning a nuclear war to the sphere of implementing political goals by means of the threat of war. The concept of political deterrence has supplemented the concept of nuclear deterrence—literally "containment by means of nuclear deterrence" [sderzhivaniye posredstvom yadernogo ustrasheniya]. It was based on the principle of the "balance of terror"—the certainty that each party to a potential nuclear conflict would inevitably suffer unacceptable damage in any nuclear war scenario. The logic of deterrence presupposed the permanent building up of the two superpowers' nuclear potentials and an increase in the number of nuclear munitions and delivery systems to an irrational level (a kind of "foolish multitude") that guaranteed the impossibility of one side winning in any meaningful way. Implementation of this concept turned into an outright arms race.

At the end of the sixties the stupidity of this approach to the organizational development of strategic nuclear forces

was so obvious that the parties to the confrontation came to the conclusion that it was expedient to seek (very cautiously and gradually) new approaches to maintaining strategic stability and to implementing the concept of combining nuclear deterrence with arms control (so far only control).

If the strategic nuclear forces of the two states (or coalitions of states) are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other in retaliation (retaliatory strikes and counterstrikes), then both sides restrain each other from aggression, military equilibrium exists between the states, and, consequently, military-strategic stability in their relations is maintained. Thus, deterrence is achieved by the possibility that strategic nuclear forces will deliver a retaliatory strike of such force in response to an enemy first strike that the idea of carrying out a first strike ceases to be attractive.

The method of maintaining strategic balance on the basis of the use of nuclear deterrence proved its effectiveness from many standpoints over the decades. But, like any "precision" instrument, it is very fragile and subject to many factors in real life. Thus, of itself the conclusion that stability exists at any specific moment of time requires a very complex analysis of the military-political and military-technical reality, and consideration of a huge number of varied and, moreover, variable quantities in the most unexpected areas. We can also cite the sensitivity of this kind of stability to different symmetries and asymmetries in arms systems, and imbalances between rivals even within the framework of the "simple bipolar world." Any changes in military potentials, on the one hand, promote the emergence of excessive suspicion in interstate relations, while, paradoxically, on the other hand objectively requiring the maintenance of a certain level of mutual confidence.

In this context many necessary but unilateral steps to sensibly improve national armed forces could upset the strategic equilibrium and should therefore be most carefully weighed up from the standpoint of whether or not they will be seen by the opposite side as an attempt to change the balance in its favor. Caution or active enmity can be caused by the improvement of the technical potential of conventional (nonnuclear) weapons, particularly in terms of warhead accuracy and yield, the development [sozdaniye] of any ABM systems with ambiguous roles, and so forth. The problem of somebody acquiring a decisive military advantage through a technological breakthrough also remains very topical. This likelihood does exist, which could tempt people to play their "untrumpable" card for the purposes of strong-arm blackmail.

That is why Russia and the United States, like other states, need to improve their strategic nuclear forces in areas that strengthen strategic equilibrium. And corresponding joint information about weapons systems in service should be envisaged.

In order to define the main avenues for the organizational development of national nuclear deterrence forces it is very useful to comprehensively analyze and take account of new concepts which have recently been actively developed and actually implemented by Western specialists in the sphere of strategic planning. These concepts are based

on the initial premise that the most realistic threat to the security of the United States and its NATO allies now comes not from Russia and the other CIS countries but from "authoritarian" regimes (read "unfriendly," as distinct, for instance, from "friendly dictators"), or regional interstate and interethnic conflicts using conventional weapons. It is within the framework of this doctrine that Western specialists have embarked on the elaboration of new approaches which will define the principles governing the use of nuclear arsenals for the next 10-20 years. In the United States in particular, in early 1993 L. Aspin, the then U.S. defense secretary, had already ordered an urgent review of the concept of the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although officially the adoption of the new concept is planned only for this year, the main problems that have arisen in the course of its elaboration have been covered in sufficient detail. In particular, the U.S. strategists will not only have to revise the list of targets, but also review once again whether the United States needs such a big nuclear potential, since maintaining it at its current level costs the United States \$10 billion a year at a time when the threat of an all-out nuclear war has significantly diminished. The military are also having to "rethink the methods for deterring new and old enemies."

It is worth noting that, in L. Aspin's opinion (and there is hardly any doubt about his competence on geostrategic matters), the main threat to U.S. security is now posed not by an increasingly predictable ("transparent") global strategic foe—as was the Soviet Union—but by a whole team of "political monsters" in the shape of "nuclear smugglers and double-dealing governments that reject international norms."

For all the lack of ambiguity in the interpretations of the role played by nuclear weapons in the present-day world, the renewed U.S. concept of "containment by means of nuclear deterrence" nonetheless remains the most important nuclear planning idea for the United States, and the novel aspect of the utilization of strategic nuclear forces will most probably lie in the search for "some kind of devilishly inventive new principles." Nothing is as yet known about these, incidentally—although L. Aspin admitted, discovering compelling reasons for it, that the approach of "monitoring the nuclear arsenal together with a threat of retribution" which had effectively influenced the Soviet Union, "may not frighten the new owners of nuclear weapons at all." In this event it cannot be ruled out, at least theoretically, that there will be an expanded range of missions for strategic nuclear weapons to carry out—from peaceful containment through deterrence on the basis of the inflicting of unacceptable damage, to the limited combat use of nuclear weapons alongside conventional (nonnuclear) systems. The main aim of the limited combat use of nuclear weapons would be to prevent a military conflict from developing into all-out hostilities—that is, in an unfavorable direction for the state under attack—and to defuse the conflict. We cannot rule out new and original ways of parrying the threat from "nuclear smugglers and double-dealing governments." For instance, the potential threat of nuclear terrorism could be eliminated by implementing the idea of global information transparency in the nuclear sphere, whereby secret activity in manufacturing and moving not only nuclear devices, but in accumulating a "critical mass" of fissile materials

would become impossible. Governments that prove intractable in this area could be (as has already happened) removed from the political scene for the required period of time by establishing control over the ruling elites in these countries or with the help (and there are plenty of examples of this too) of limited military and other sanctions—which would easily be feasible within the framework of a policy of regionalism or simply under UN mandate. But the latter measures might not always be successful—therefore the reality of using strong-arm methods, regrettable though it may be, should be retained.

We should be more interested in the question of whether Russia is ready to propose its own vision of the use of strategic nuclear forces. The undoubtedly honest position of the new Russian military doctrine—now being extensively commented upon—on the possible use of a nuclear first strike can be seen mainly as a reaction to traditional strategic challenges and as being largely brought about by the country's situation and, accordingly, by the state of its Armed Forces. To all appearances, even the modernization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which is suggested under the framework of the treaties on offensive arms reduction, does not make it possible to do anything but implement deterrence within the framework also of the "traditional" military-strategic situation with the criterion of inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor in retaliatory action.

When talking of the category of "unacceptable damage," we should take account of present-day views of this problem. We realize now that this category has, as it were, two dimensions, and can be framed within two systems of coordinates. It is usual to consider (and, incidentally, this understanding emerged relatively recently), that the criterion of unacceptable damage exists simultaneously as a certain quantitative level of losses and as a kind of psychological barrier.

The question of the norm of unacceptable damage is incredibly complex. Military specialists honestly admit the failure of the numerous attempts to define a more or less objective level for it. Staffs in both Russia and the United States are now using in their practical activity the mathematical value of a set amount of damage (required for deterrence) which nonetheless plays an important role in assessing the strategic balance when defining the limits of restrictions in the course of drawing up disarmament treaties and, most important of all, serves as a kind of guideline in shaping major state programs for the quantitative and qualitative development of strategic offensive arms.

We should not downplay the positive significance that the idea of a quantitative assessment of the force required to inflict "unacceptable damage" on an enemy has possessed for the development of the strategic situation, looked at retrospectively. It was this idea that made it possible to conclude more or less objectively that there was nuclear parity between the USSR and the United States—which made it possible for one of the parties to dump its psychological baggage and provided an incentive for a disarmament process based on mutual recognition of the impossibility of either side's winning any substantial advantage in the context of balanced cuts in strategic offensive arms. At the same time, let us emphasize yet



again that the criterion of "unacceptable damage" was to all intents and purposes never used as the basis for the adoption of the "final" decision to launch a nuclear strike within the context of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Its mechanistic meaning (incidentally, if it could have been used as a guideline, then the choice of the time to launch a first strike could easily have been delegated to computers) cannot be related to the huge moral responsibility which a political leader would have to assume when deciding to start a nuclear war. We need only recall the Caribbean crisis, when the correlation of nuclear munitions was 17-1 in favor of the United States. (The Soviet Union had around 290 nuclear munitions, while the Americans had something in the order of 5,000). You can also imagine under what scenario the war in the Persian Gulf would have been played out if Iraq had had a few primitive nuclear munitions at the time. Most probably there would have been no war, and the task of liberating Kuwait would have been resolved by different means.

Few people give much thought to the fact that the category of terror and the category of "unacceptable damage" in its psychological dimension are historical categories—times change, old moral principles and stereotypes are being tightened up and new ones are taking shape; attitudes toward the permissibility and probability of nuclear war are also being reconsidered by the political leaders of the major nuclear powers. Throughout postwar history common sense has never yet deserted them, which has made it possible at least to avert several global nuclear conflicts. There are no grounds for supposing that the current U.S. leaders have "frozen" their idea of what constitutes acceptable damage for their country as a result of an exchange of nuclear strikes with Russia at the level imagined by President Eisenhower. When in 1989 the U.S. plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, drawn up in 1957, was declassified, environmental specialists were quick to produce a model of the consequences for the United States of launching such a nuclear strike against the USSR. It turned out that if all the planned 180 high-yield atomic and hydrogen bombs were exploded on Soviet territory, the USSR would be guaranteed to cease to exist as a state, but in two or three weeks the level of radioactive fallout on U.S. territory as a result of the natural spread of radioactive dust through atmospheric air currents would be comparable to 60 Chernobyls. Of course, the accuracy of these assessments (from the "greenhouse effect" to "nuclear winter") can be disputed, but one would like to hope that nobody would try to do a real experiment to check them out.

More and more experts today are inclined to think that nuclear weapons cannot be used in principle.

It is, nevertheless, not possible to wholly agree with this, since the unambiguous exclusion of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons removes their deterrent effect. You could even use sophistry to prove the opposite. But in practice the basis of deterrence is the probability of the use of nuclear weapons. References to the irrationality of their use and their terrible consequences, which make it impossible to achieve the political aims of a war, are convincing but leave room for doubt. For instance, in August 1914, when World War I was already building up a head of steam in Europe, certain U.S. newspapers thought it appropriate

to state something to the effect that the systems (primarily artillery systems) in the sides' arsenals were so destructive that it was difficult even to imagine the consequences of a war—and therefore there could simply not be a war. Another example is that Indian tradition has it that the events described in the heroic epic "The Mahabharata" (compiled in its present form around the middle of the first millennium) relate to some wars and great social upheavals of the fourth millennium BC. The epic describes various types of what we would now call mass destruction weapons, whose use required a difficult psychological barrier to be overcome. R. Oppenheimer, one of the developers of the atomic bomb, directly associated the Mahabharata's "light brighter than a thousand suns" with a nuclear explosion. For us it is not so important which modern arms systems might correlate to the types of weapons described there. What is important was something else—there was an entire science behind their use (star-gazing and their own system of combat using "divine weapons"). "No man should ever think of warring with them. Should they fall into the hands of the weak, they could consume this entire transient world. They should always be used as a defense against other weapons. They are wonderful, they cannot be parried, but they can repulse an attack in which any other weapon is used [divnoye, ono neotvratimo, no udar vsyakim drugim oruzhiyem ono otbivayet]." The psychological barrier was nonetheless overcome, and the weapons were used, despite the warning that some types of them would lead to an effect, seen in a modern reading, on the human genetic code. We can only hope that the current system of deterrence will prove more effective.

It should not, however, be thought that the existence of nuclear forces under present-day conditions is able to prevent the unleashing of any conventional wars and armed conflicts—particularly on the periphery of the superpowers' spheres of influence. Since there are now a multitude of precisely such conflicts, nuclear weapons are not omnipotent. Hence the need to develop conventional systems—precision weapons. The development of precision weapons is also expedient for another reason—states (albeit in the very distant future, or at least not in the foreseeable future) may give up nuclear weapons, and the full burden of the task of ensuring deterrence will be borne by conventional weapons systems. This will not happen in one sudden surge, there should be a long period when the task of deterrence is resolved through the combined use of nuclear and conventional systems. But the task of developing precision weapons is very complex, requires the diversion of considerable material and financial expenditure, and will last just as long—since it depends on the development [razrabotka] not just of precision systems but on computerized reconnaissance, targeting, and guidance networks. Consequently, the basis for its elaboration should be developed right now. But, at the same time, it is necessary to recall that if a state does not have the requisite conventional weapons for deterrence, then it should not destroy its nuclear weapons even if all other states scrapped their nuclear weapons. Otherwise this would lead to a destabilization of the situation and to the possible unleashing of a war or military conflict.

Thus, we can conclude that the main role of the Russian strategic nuclear forces should be to continue to safeguard



Russia's national security. And the makeup of these forces, the technical features of their systems, the organization of their combat and auxiliary subunits, and so forth should meet two criteria—first, the ability to effectively deter any aggressor against launching a war; and, second, the ability to put a stop to aggression by ruling out the possibility of a military conflict escalating into large-scale hostilities, to suppress military conflict, and to ensure a quest for compromise in the course of peace talks.

From the preceding reflections it becomes clear that we currently have a fundamental opportunity for a fairly broad choice of ways to develop the Russian strategic nuclear forces. It is even permissible to speak of their possible radical restructuring with the complete renouncement of the use of old stereotypes and strategic concepts, as if going back to the very beginning, and, incidentally, the situation regarding the reappraisal of values in the country as a whole accords with this. However, in the face of the systemic crisis which Russia and other CIS states have found themselves in, tough restrictions, mainly financial ones, have been imposed on the choice of real ways of developing strategic offensive arms. The majority of Russian military specialists agree that only two of them are realistically practicable: Either to "go it alone" and take unilateral steps to reduce the numerical strength of the strategic nuclear forces and change their structure, or else to conduct the modernization of the strategic nuclear forces within the framework of the process of the mutual reduction of strategic nuclear arms with our former main opponent, and then in coordination with other member states of the nuclear club. Circumstances have taken shape in such a way that Russia has taken the second path, which is justified in the present conditions. Although well-founded misgivings exist concerning the possibility of the American side, even within the framework of the restrictions of the START I and START II Treaties, to quickly increase its nuclear potential if the United States were to withdraw from these treaties, the rules of the game which have been adopted are nevertheless better than a situation whereby the Americans could do this without any of the current restrictions.

START II, as an important international document, has been the subject of a most careful study by a wide circle of Russian experts. A multitude of articles exists on practically every aspect of the problems of strategic stability, which this treaty raises and broaches. The fact that good work has been done on this question from the viewpoint of information and analysis obviates the need for us to further examine the quantitative and qualitative restrictions which the treaty places on the strategic nuclear potentials of Russia and the United States. It is appropriate to ask oneself just the main question here: Will the treaty preserve strategic stability and will the new level of the nuclear potential established for Russia be sufficient as a deterrent? When analyzing these problems, two focal points in the discussions of various aspects of this treaty must be singled out. This concerns first of all a triadic (Strategic Missile Forces plus Navy and Air Force strategic nuclear forces) or a dyadic (Strategic Missile Forces plus either Navy or Air Force strategic nuclear forces, and so on) structure of the strategic nuclear forces, and the number of nuclear munitions which Russia is authorized to have. Second, the quantitative distribution of the

number of munitions among the various components (naval, air, and land-based) of strategic offensive arms. The expediency of a triadic or dyadic structure of strategic nuclear forces for a particular state is determined by its geostrategic position, the capacity of its technical personnel and resources for servicing strategic nuclear weapons, the tactical-technical characteristics of the strategic nuclear forces it has, and the parameters of its means of active counteraction against a potential adversary. Thus, by assessing the aforesaid parameters of the United States' systems, we will obtain practically equal combat capabilities for the land-based and naval components of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces in terms of hitting targets. This testifies to the possibility of the United States transferring to a dyadic (naval and air components) structure of strategic nuclear forces and the elimination of land-based ICBMs.

Unlike the United States, an effective strategic nuclear forces structure for Russia which would guarantee the nuclear deterrence of any aggressor in any strategic situations, is a triad: Strategic Missile Forces plus Naval strategic nuclear forces plus Air Force strategic nuclear forces. Excluding the Strategic Missile Forces, the Naval strategic nuclear forces or the Air Force strategic nuclear forces from the triadic structure of Russia's strategic nuclear forces would lead, according to certain calculations, to an increase in the number of nuclear munitions required for deterrence within the strategic nuclear forces by a factor of 1.2-1.6, and in individual strategic situations, to the non-fulfill of the combat mission. This discrepancy in the rational structures whereby the Russian and the U.S. strategic nuclear forces are composed is attributable to the inferior survivability of the naval component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (see V. Belousov's article) as compared with the analogous parameters of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. This deficiency in the Russian naval strategic nuclear forces may be compensated for and is compensated for by a Strategic Missile Forces land-based stationary and also road-mobile force. The triadic structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces provides a guaranteed counter to technological breakthroughs in the military sphere, for example in air defense, ABM defense, or antisubmarine defense. Such a strategic nuclear force structure creates a great deal of uncertainty for a possible aggressor as to the effectiveness of his preemptive strike, and is a factor which stabilizes the strategic equilibrium. Therefore it is impermissible to remove one of the components from the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

#### Seminar Discusses Aftermath of Semipalatinsk Nuclear Tests

LD1305093694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0848 GMT 13 May 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentin Pavlov]

[Text] Barnaul May 13 TASS—Residents in the Altay territory were subjected to radiation from 58 explosions between 1949 and 1990, including the first thermonuclear weapon test in August 1953, said speakers at the three-day session of the Scientific Council in Barnaul on the appraisal of Semipalatinsk explosions aftermaths on the Altay territory population.

Results of investigations confirm that the radioactive fallout of nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk proving ground covered nearly the entire Altay territory. People received doses on the verge of radiation injury in some areas.

Over a third of population living in fallout areas died in the first five-seven years after the 1949 explosion. A new wave of oncological diseases, hemopathies, diseases of hematogenous organs and genetic mutations is now observed when the third generation of radiated people has become child-bearing.

These and other facts from the history of Soviet nuclear testing were revealed at the above-mentioned session which ended its work on Friday. It was attended by scientists from nearly 60 research institutions.

Physicists, chemists, biologists, doctors and sociologists discussed the results of last year's research work and progress in implementing the "Polygon" comprehensive programme in the Altay territory, providing for urgent measures to overcome aftermaths of nuclear explosions, to improve the ecological situation and people's health as well as to give a boost to social and economic development of afflicted villages.

The session mapped out guidelines for further research. Valentin Koptug, president of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pointed to the great importance for the international scientific community of massive medical checkup of irradiated people, which was carried in the Altay territory for the first time in the world.

According to scientists, this session of "the programme on distant radiation aftereffects of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk proving ground on the Altay territory population" (official name of the session) has also become an important stage in preparations for an international conference on the "radtest" (radiation test) programme to be held in the Altay territory next September.

#### **Soskovets Says 'New High Tech' Excluded From Military Exports**

LD1605135494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1311 GMT 16 May 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Alfred Artamonov, Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Izhevsk May 16 TASS—"The state will fulfill its commitments to the defence industry," said First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets during his visit to the "Izhmash" plant today. "After the budget is endorsed, in the near future this might become a reality," he said.

According to Soskovets, the state intends to boost the development of more advanced technologies for the armed forces and advocate a liberal approach to the realisation of military exports. Soskovets pointed out that exporting weapons, the government will take into account political interests of the state, and the liberalisation of exports will be beneficial for manufacturers.

Soskovets pointed out that the government will offer defence enterprises an opportunity to independently work for exports. "However, the state does not intend to sell a

number of military hardware constructed on the basis of absolutely new high tech, which affects the country's defence," Soskovets said.

### **KAZAKHSTAN**

#### **Reduced Staffing Causes Problems at Semipalatinsk**

PM0905150794 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Apr 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Semipalatinsk test site by S. Polyayev, identified by caption]

[Text] [161043] [Polyayev over video of posters and bust of Academician Kurchatov followed by a wall chart of Semipalatinsk test site] Russia is prepared to extend the moratorium on nuclear tests. In connection with this it is envisaged that all Russian scientists will have left the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk by the beginning of July. Incidentally, right now only 20 percent of the original number of servicing personnel remain at the site. This is insufficient to maintain the site properly and to ensure its security. [video shows dilapidated buildings, followed by extensive aerial views of test site captioned "Video material supplied by Moscow Office of TBS"] At the insistence of the Kazakhstani Air Force, helicopter flights over the nuclear facilities without a special permit are banned. The last authorized flight took place 13 February this year.

Despite the high level of radioactivity at the test site, the facilities are not being guarded. Furthermore, the local authorities are seriously considering setting up a livestock farm on the territory of the site. The military also fear that abandoned equipment and cables, which could constitute a radioactive hazard, may be removed by pilferers. An unexploded nuclear charge which remains in one of the galleries also presents a threat. It cannot be defused because there are no specialists, and it cannot be exploded. [161146] [video shows extensive aerial views of site and some closeups of abandoned facilities]

### **UKRAINE**

#### **Kravchuk Says Nuclear Disarmament Program On Schedule**

LD1305130994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1302 GMT 13 May 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko, Mikhail Melnik]

[Text] Kiev May 13 TASS—The process of dismantling and pullout of nuclear warheads from Ukraine into Russia is under full control and goes ahead as scheduled. A total of 180 warheads had been removed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation by now, said Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in an interview with ITAR-TASS at an opening ceremony of the Kiev spring fair on Friday.

"It is no secret for anyone that combat nuclear missiles stationed on the Ukrainian territory were not under Ukraine's control since the 'nuclear button' was in Moscow. Besides, Ukraine never sought to take possession of such dangerous weapons," the Ukrainian president said. He confirmed Ukraine's intention to implement in full a

tripartite agreement signed by the Russian, Ukrainian and the U.S. presidents at the beginning of 1994.

"We signed the agreement, hoping that other nuclear countries would take adequate measures and begin disarmament," Kravchuk said. He pointed out that according to information at his disposal the United States intends to make large-scale cuts of their nuclear arsenals, fulfilling agreements reached during the Moscow meeting.

He went on to say that by the end of May all American missiles targeted at Ukraine would be re-coded. "The time comes when our countries will really switch over from words of friendship and cooperation to concrete deeds," he said.

#### **Missile Agreement With U.S. Viewed**

*LD1405182294 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 14 May 94*

[Text] A ceremonial signing of a memorandum on mutual understanding between the governments of Ukraine and the United States of America about the transfer of the missile equipment and technologies took place in the White House. Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov and U.S. Vice President Al Gore signed the document.

Proceeding from common interest in maintaining and consolidating international peace and security, says the document, the governments of both countries are ready to jointly counteract the proliferation of the missile equipment and technologies which could contribute to the elaboration of acquisition of the missile systems for delivering mass annihilation weapons.

The memorandum envisages a package of measures aimed at strict control over the proliferation of missile technologies, the carrying out of joint inspections and consultations in this field, exchange of relevant data in case missile equipment and technologies are transferred.

Meanwhile, the memorandum emphasizes that the regime of control over the missile technologies rules out the

creation of obstacles in the way of creating Ukraine's national space program or its cooperation with other missile and space states in this sphere.

By signing this document the United States of America, as a matter of fact, recognized Ukraine's just interests in preserving and further promoting scientific, technological and production capacity of Ukraine in the missile and space field. This agreement also means that Ukraine is recognized as an equal participant in international cooperation and a subject of the world aerospace market.

The second important result of the work done by the Ukrainian delegation, led by Valeriy Shmarov, in the U.S. capital was the adoption of a joint statement in which the governments of both countries reaffirm their loyalty to building relations of partnership, mutual trust and respect, and further developing new relations in the cause of security and defense.

Recognizing Ukraine's positive contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament, the specific steps toward deactivating missile installations in Ukraine and the implementation of the trilateral statement as a whole, the Government of the United States of America, in response, announced that after 30 May this year the U.S. strategic missiles will no longer be targeted at Ukraine.

This document also emphasizes that as from this date the U.S. missiles will not be targeted at the territories of other countries, which will testify to the lessening of nuclear threat in the world as a whole.

Speaking at the signing ceremony in the White House, U.S. Vice President Al Gore underlined that by its actions in many fields over the year Ukraine has proved that it is a reliable and responsible partner.

The adoption and signing of these important Ukrainian-American documents is yet another concrete step toward fulfilling the program of a broad development of bilateral relations signed by the presidents of Ukraine and the USA Leonid Kravchuk and Bill Clinton. An agreement was achieved on further contacts between both sides.

On behalf of the president and the government of our state Valeriy Shmarov invited the U.S. Vice President to visit Ukraine at a time convenient to him. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

## FRANCE

**Massive Investment in Nuclear Explosion Simulator Planned**

BR0905100194 Paris LE FIGARO in French  
23-24 Apr 94 p 8

[Jean-Paul Croize report: "Nuclear Explosions Inside Computers"]

[Text] When the military planning law for the period 1995-2000 was presented, it was revealed that between now and the end of the century more than 10 billion French francs [Fr] are to be invested in developing a highly-sophisticated system for simulating nuclear explosions. This is a major scientific decision since it will enable experts at the French Arms Delegation (DGA) and the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]—who have been pondering the design of such a system since 1991 in the framework of the Palen program (for the preparation and limitation of nuclear testing)—to devise new methods for performing heavy-duty studies and experiments. Notable developments include extremely powerful lasers and high-performance computers which would also have considerable benefits for the civil domain.

While it is hard to imagine, the means do exist for simulating or partially reconstructing the diabolical energy release that is characterized by the triggering of a thermonuclear bomb. Better still, while the most complex means of simulation are still confined to the realms of theory, certain others already exist in concrete form. In two decades these resources have reduced the annual number of real nuclear tests carried out on the Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean from a dozen to just five, before the total test ban moratorium was imposed in April 1992.

The equipment already used in a number of Defense Ministry research centers make it possible to reconstruct some of the main mechanical or electromagnetic effects of a nuclear explosion, such as the blast, the heat wave, and the high-energy radiation flux that is generated. One of the simplest simulation tools to design—but still delicate to use and particularly impressive to see in action—is the giant blast tunnel at Grammat in the Lot region of France. Some 110 m long and 12 m wide, this structure, camouflaged to blend into the countryside, makes it possible to subject different types of military equipment to a very violent and instantaneous pressurization caused by the release in less than one-hundredth of a second of 300,000 lt of air stored in giant compressors. This involves generating eight million times the normal atmospheric pressure, equivalent to the shock wave of a thermonuclear explosion, which, in the tunnel, sweeps jeeps aside like mere wisps of straw.

Another, less spectacular example but equipment that is doubtless even more complex to use, is the "radiation chamber" that has been built in the Vernon ballistics and aerodynamics research laboratory. This tool—the only one of its kind in Europe—makes it possible to subject all types of electronic components to the kind of intense electromagnetic flash generated by an atomic bomb.

However, scientists have yet to implement the most difficult type of nuclear simulation: reconstructing the processes that lie at the heart of the explosion and which, in a

few hundredths of a second, cause matter to change into other, lighter, atomic elements, generating an enormous amount of energy in the process. To improve the effectiveness of existing weapons and to design new ones—like the famous neutron bombs—it is vital to be able to accurately predict the operational effectiveness of various kinds of architecture and to select one material in preference to another. As a result it is essential to have "keys" composed either of real tests or a series of physical simulations and calculations using codes detailed enough to accurately determine by "virtual" means the way in which this energy will be released and then dispersed.

If they are to pinpoint the actual transmutation of elements during an atomic explosion, scientists in the AEC's military applications department will have to develop the two tools that are essential for any nuclear simulation: power lasers and massively parallel computers. The credits awarded for this task for the five years covered by the military planning law far exceed those currently allocated: the decision to invest a sum of Fr10 billion practically multiplies tenfold the budget for the Palen program which this year stands at Fr300 million.

On the computing level this will be enough to provide considerable stimulus for the work being done in France in the field of so-called "massively parallel" computing: using machines whose architecture is such that they can perform simultaneous rather than successive calculations interactively—i.e. in parallel. This technology is still in its infancy, but it appears to be the only way of processing the phenomenal amount of data (people are talking of several hundred billion instructions per second) that this type of simulation requires—even harder to do, say the experts, than atmospheric modeling.

Mastering such computing power, the experts claim, could only benefit the resource-hungry calculations used in weather forecasting and computer-assisted aircraft design.

In the field of lasers, the Palen program would enable France to build tools performing better than Phebus, the most powerful device currently being used by the AEC in Limeil, near Paris. Capable of delivering power of almost 10 kilojoules for about a billionth of a second, this would already be enough to light veritable miniature suns heating minuscule samples of matter to over 10 million degrees. The matter would then be converted into plasma such as is found in the core of a thermonuclear weapon. A major line of research in future years will consist of designing a system for amplifying the flashes emitted by such types of equipment to exceed the performance of the American "Nova," currently the most powerful laser in the world that can put out around 50 kilojoules in flashes of light emitted in a single time period of around one nanosecond.

In the civil domain, tools such as this would make it easier to examine the technology needed to master continuous fusion, i.e. generated in reactors that can supply infinitely more energy than existing atomic power stations. However, if we are to believe many military experts, several more real nuclear tests are needed to perfectly calibrate their data with the processes that occur inside a real bomb.



## Controversy Over Mitterrand's Comments on Nuke Tests

### Mitterrand Says No Tests After '95

LD0505184194 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 1700 GMT 5 May 94

[Text] France will not resume its nuclear tests even after 1995. This sentence uttered by Francois Mitterrand at the Elysee sounds like a promise, a determination and a political testament. The head of state this afternoon extended an invitation to all French figures concerned with defense affairs and nuclear issues. Addressing his guests, among whom were Defense Minister Francois Leotard and the chiefs-of-staff of the three armed services, the president, standing between the French and European flags, thus made the promise that nuclear tests would no longer be carried out in France: [begin recording]

**Mitterrand:** No other tests will take place before May 1995, that is before a year from now. I know that a good dialectician... [pauses] It is said that this is not very important because this decision is not dangerous if taken within a year; the decision will be taken as soon as Mitterrand is gone! Let me say this to you, ladies and gentlemen: Nobody will do it after me! Nobody will do it, unless of course, another nuclear power starts its tests. I have already said that we will not do it because France would not like to see the French people and the whole world come to harm by re-launching a nuclear arms race, thus holding the third world and all the poor countries up to ridicule. Nor would France like to be the country that puts nuclear war on the map again. [end recording]. [passage omitted]

### Leotard Says Testing Should Continue

LD0605153294 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 1500 GMT 6 May 94

[text] After Alain Juppe's remarks this morning, Francois Leotard has said he thinks that nuclear tests should continue. The defense minister restated this before the finance select committee of the National Assembly. He is thus in complete disagreement with Francois Mitterrand who yesterday afternoon reaffirmed his determination to maintain the moratorium on French nuclear testing.

### Juppe Reacts to Mitterrand's Remarks

LD0605084394 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 0700 GMT 6 May 94

[Excerpts] The topic everyone is discussing this morning is the one which Francois Mitterrand has just relaunched concerning nuclear testing. At the Elysee [president's office] yesterday the head of state in fact expressed great firmness over the costs, reaffirming his opposition to any resumption of nuclear testing. The statement has been well received by the Left, but criticized by the Right. [passage omitted]

Without being totally opposed to the head of state, [Foreign Minister] Alain Juppe is less convinced: the refusal to resume testing threatens the entire nuclear deterrent system, the foreign minister believes: [begin recording]

**Juppe:** We need a credible and adequate deterrent force. It exists today; will it exist in 10 years' time? We are not

certain of that, because it has to be modernized, and in order to modernize it many experts, in fact most experts, consider that further nuclear testing will be necessary, before computer simulation makes it possible for us to do without it. The president of the republic has taken up a position. That is his right, no one contests his position as head of the armed forces up until the end of his mandate. But he cannot anticipate what his successor will do. It is for the future president of the republic in May 1995 to explain to the French people what his concept of the matter is. [end recording]

That was Alain Juppe, who was the guest of Annette Ardisson just now at 0820 on France-Inter.

### Details of Nuclear Arsenal Cited

AU0605101694 Paris AFP in English 0946 GMT 6 May 94

[Text] Paris, May 6 (AFP)—The question of whether to continue with nuclear tests is a "major point of disagreement" between the conservative French government and socialist President Francois Mitterrand, Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said on French radio Friday.

In a review of French defence strategy Thursday evening, Mitterrand told defence chiefs the current moratorium on testing nuclear warheads would remain as long as he was president. Mitterrand's mandate ends next May.

Throwing a defiant challenge to any successor, almost certain to be a right-winger, he said future presidents would not dare to resume testing for fear of offending the whole world by relaunching the nuclear arms race, and urged them to move to computer-simulated tests.

Juppe, responding on France-Inter radio, said the issue was "a major point of disagreement" with the government, which wants to keep its options open.

No one questioned Mitterrand's authority as head of the armed forces until the end of the mandate, but "he cannot anticipate what his successor will do," the minister commented. "It is for the future president (...) to explain his vision to the French people."

As for computer-generated tests, "most experts think further nuclear tests are needed" before this was possible," he added.

A conservative member of parliament's defence committee used stronger language, saying Friday that Mitterrand was making a "vain testament, a farewell to arms" rather than showing a "vision of the future."

The president "remains strangely faithful to an outmoded vision of the bipolar world of the Cold War, without taking account of the new unpredictable dangers which we should defend ourselves against," said Jacques Baumel, from the ruling coalition party Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR).

Juppe said he agreed with the broad thrust of the president's arguments.

This was that it was vital to French interests to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent and keep out of NATO's military command, to allocate more money to computer research and strengthen overall disarmament, he said.

"There is no question today of rejoining the military organisation" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, said Juppe, who said development of computer simulation "will allow us to move on from nuclear tests one day."

Mitterrand, speaking to military and civilian defence chiefs at his Elysee palace after the adoption of a bill setting out France's defence strategy for the next six years, had said French nuclear weapons would remain "under sole French control."

He said he stood by the late president Charles de Gaulle's 1966 decision to pull out of NATO's military command. "I firmly maintain this decision. Nothing will make me change it," he said.

Mitterrand also gave the first-ever official details of his country's nuclear arsenal, saying France had some 500 nuclear warheads.

The deterrent relied mainly on five nuclear-powered submarines which each carried 16 missiles with six independently targeted warheads. The number in service at any one time was 64 missiles, carrying a total of 384 warheads, each of 150 kilotonnes yield, Mitterrand said.

#### **Mitterrand Statement Termed Provocative**

BR0605135294 Paris *LIBERATION* in French  
6 May 94 p 6

[Article by Dominique Garraud: "Mitterrand: 'After Me, No More Nuclear Tests'"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday, the head of state reaffirmed his primacy regarding defense matters by issuing a statement opposing any resumption of nuclear tests. In his opinion, the next president of the Republic will have to maintain the moratorium, for "France will not want to offend the world."

Francois Mitterrand has an acute sense of provocation. Yesterday, in an unprecedented move, the head of state gathered in the banquet hall of the Elysee [presidential palace] 200 people directly concerned with the nuclear deterrent, including army commanders, industrialists, scientists, members of Parliament, and ministers. With the exception of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, all his former defense ministers were there, as well as current Defense Minister Francois Leotard. However, there was no Edouard Balladur, who was elsewhere, officially for obscure reasons regarding the use of time. [passage omitted]

As the guardian of a De Gaullean dogma regarding deterrence, Francois Mitterrand reaffirmed the pillars thereof: "The key aim of deterrence is to avoid war by safeguarding the integrity of national territory and ensuring the defense of our vital interests," he professed. As for the notion of the "final warning" which emerged in the sixties, it is a "terminal warning" which must not be led astray and become some kind of "nuclear artillery."

Looking at Francois Leotard, the head of state proved menacing on the subject of the government's majority. "Mr. Defense Minister, you intend to tell the National Assembly that it should provide itself with the means of response or attack against the weak or crazy. Should we use nuclear weapons outside our territory or apart from our

vital interests? Must we rally to the adherents of the surgical, or even decapitating, nuclear strike? And why not a nuclear gun? To me that would seem to be a major heresy. There is no way I will accept it. And if an amendment in this sense came to be adopted, it would lead to a major conflict which the French people would have to decide on." Clearly, he was threatening to dissolve the Assembly.

The paradox is that this risk would appear to be infinitesimal. While Edouard Balladur remains very discreet on these issues, Francois Leotard will mark his opposition to any measure that would result in nuclear weapons becoming an everyday feature. And in the Assembly, the committed proponents of decapitating nuclear strikes, led by RPR [Rally for the Republic] member Jacques Baume, can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

By stating his views ceremoniously, Francois Mitterrand reiterated that nothing concerning the policy of nuclear deterrence can be done without him. In passing, he will certainly trigger several skirmishes within the government's majority against the excessive lenience supposedly shown by Edouard Balladur toward the president.

The provocative aspect of Francois Mitterrand's speech is not insignificant just before the parliamentary debate on defense issues. However, yesterday's exercise will go much further than the end of the upcoming parliamentary debate. "The movement calling for nuclear disarmament is healthy," said Francois Mitterrand, voicing his support for a renewal of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a "universal, verifiable" treaty banning tests. And that will not necessarily be the vision of the next president of the Republic, especially if his name is Jacques Chirac.

#### **Balladur Views French Positions in NPT, CTBT Negotiations**

BR1105130194 Paris *LE FIGARO* in French  
11 May 94 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Nuclear Testing: Balladur Disagrees With Mitterrand"]

[Text] Prime Minister Edouard Balladur yesterday closed the 48th session of the IHEDN [National Institute for High-Level Studies] at the French Military School with a speech in which he stated his views on defense. The text of his speech revealed that he does not share the views of the president of the Republic with regard to nuclear deterrent policy.

The prime minister did not rule out "the possible restart of nuclear testing, depending on the international situation and the behavior of the other nuclear powers," stressing that "France never agreed to link the suspension of its nuclear testing with the negotiation" of the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Mr. Balladur explained that this possible restart of testing and "our involvement in the negotiation" of the treaty "were not therefore incompatible." The prime minister reiterated that, on 13 October, he had told the National Assembly that the government "would not subscribe to any definitive ban on testing as long as it felt such testing was essential to the technical credibility of our deterrent force."

#### **'Threshold' Countries**

With these words, Mr. Balladur set himself apart from the stance taken on nuclear testing by Mr. Mitterrand last Thursday. In a speech to 200 guests, including representatives of the military establishment and arms manufacturers, the head of state assured his audience that "for as long as he remained in office, there would be no further testing." He also said he was convinced that "after [he had gone], they would not [restart testing] because France will not want to offend the whole world by restarting the arms race." He added: "I have confidence in my successors; they will not be able to do otherwise," implicitly referring to the upcoming diplomatic deadlines of the revision of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and the conclusion of a test ban treaty expected shortly afterwards.

The prime minister also asked that the "threshold" countries (those on the verge of acquiring nuclear arms) should participate in the drawing up of the CTBT, something that is not currently envisaged. Edouard Balladur considered that the "forum for negotiation, which must be multilateral, should immediately involve the threshold countries." He continued: "It is very important for the disarmament conference to extend as far as possible so that all threshold countries are represented." With regard to the implementation of the treaty, Mr. Balladur warned that it could only take effect if the threshold countries also ratified it.

While the chairman of the committee charged with drawing up the text for this complete test ban after the winter session of the disarmament conference said at the end of March that this treaty could be ready by 1995, Mr. Balladur emphasized that "there was absolutely no fixed deadline for the conclusion" of the treaty which is to "settle numerous and complex" issues. The prime minister added that the government would refuse "in particular that the extension of the NPT at the May 1995 conference

were dependent on the conclusion of a CTBT." He warned: "The failure to extend the NPT could place question marks over our commitment to a test ban treaty."

#### **Conscription To Remain**

In addition, Edouard Balladur considered that the mixed-army system was "certainly not designed to be inflexible," even if, "in the short- to medium-term, the Armed Forces cannot do without conscription." Mr. Balladur continued: "The government has made choices for the foreseeable future, some 15 years hence," and he considered it "high likely" that "the system will evolve in one direction or another after that time." Where the "modalities of this evolution" were concerned, the prime minister said that he thought it was "wiser to firstly implement the military programming law (...) before trying to imagine future changes."

Nevertheless, the prime minister stressed that he "did not believe" that a professional Army would "be sufficient to meet French defense obligations and ambitions." He said: "France has ambitions and responsibilities far beyond its national borders (...) which require a large [defense system]." He pointed out that a professional Army not only posed the question of structural coherence in view of missions, but also of human resources and cost.

With regard to staffing levels, Mr. Balladur estimated that some 48,000 men would have to be hired every year if conscription were to be abolished. He noted that the United Kingdom had "problems recruiting 28,000 men per year." With regard to cost, he explained that if forces were reduced by 20 percent as a result of total professionalization, there would be "annual additional expenditure of 20 to 25 billion francs." He added: "Thus, unless the defense budget were increased together with levy on national wealth, abolishing conscription would lead to a drastic reduction in the size of the Armed Forces."

### India to Export Heavy Water to South Korea Under Agreement

94WP0088A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
9 Apr 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi—India will ship 100 tonnes of heavy water for use in a nuclear power plant in South Korea under an agreement signed at Seoul on Friday, according to the Department of Atomic Energy, reports PTI.

The deal worth \$23 million is the first major commercial export of strategic nuclear material from India which is now a world's leading producer of heavy water.

The material which will be shipped in 1997-98 will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

### Japan Offers \$16 million for Nuclear Disarmament in Ukraine

LD0605134194 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1200 GMT 6 May 94

[Text] A UNIAN correspondent was informed by the Japanese Embassy in Ukraine that out of the \$100 million allocated by the Japanese Government to dismantling the nuclear weapons of Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, our country will receive \$16 million, with Japan expecting specific projects [to be implemented] by Ukraine using this money.

Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry says that both countries are in the process of drafting a joint declaration on the principles of cooperation between Ukraine and Japan, a memorandum of understanding between the two states' foreign political departments, and an intergovernmental agreement on the mutual encouragement and protection of investments, as well as working to settle the issue of Ukraine's legal succession with regard to the contractual and legal basis that was formed in relations between Japan and the former USSR.

### IAEA Again Proposes Inspections to DPRK Prior to Deadline

SK1005232694 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2200 GMT 10 May 94

[By Vienna-based correspondent Cha Man-sun]

[Text] With the approaching deadline for submitting a report on the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] again notified North Korea, as it did previously, that it will send an inspection team as soon as North Korea allows the sampling of spent fuel when nuclear fuel is replaced.

In a message sent to North Korea early this morning, the IAEA reminded North Korea that the deadline for submitting a report to the UN Security Council is approaching, and stated that even though the inspection on the replacement of fuel rods has been delayed considerably, it will send an inspection team around this weekend if North Korea accepts the IAEA proposal by this week.

The IAEA expects North Korea to show a positive response this week or early next week depending on the

result of the recent contacts with the United States. However, in case North Korea shows a negative response, including the replacement of nuclear fuel on its own, the IAEA's position is that a report to the UN Security Council will be inevitable.

### IAEA Says Inspectors Ready To Go to DPRK From 14 May

AU1105081594 Paris AFP in English  
0751 GMT 11 May 94

[Text] Vienna, May 11 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has asked North Korean experts to visit Vienna for talks on replacing fuel rods in a nuclear reactor, the agency announced Wednesday [11 May].

In addition, agency inspectors would visit North Korea "in the next few days" if the replacement of the rods in the Yonbyon reactor was postponed, the IAEA said in a statement.

U.S. officials say the change of fuel rods could provide enough plutonium to make four or five nuclear weapons.

The IAEA has been insisting on not only witnessing the fuel change but also on sampling the used fuel to determine whether the Stalinist country has diverted fissile material for weapons.

IAEA director general Hans Blix proposed to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Young-Nam in a telex message that North Korea send a team of experts to Vienna to discuss these measures and the timetable for replacement of the rods, the statement said.

"In the meantime, on the assumption that the core discharge is deferred, the IAEA proposes to send an inspection team in the next few days."

"This team is to carry out the activities which the IAEA was not able to implement during the inspection in March at the reprocessing plant."

Blix reaffirmed in the telex that it was very important to take samples from the fuel rods of a five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, some 90 kilometers (56 miles) north of Pyongyang, to measure their radioactivity levels.

But the IAEA chief suggested that the actual testing of the fuel rods could be carried out "in the second half of this year," a spokesman for South Korea's foreign ministry said in Seoul.

The Blix message was an answer to the North Korean foreign minister's proposal on Friday that Pyongyang could negotiate with the IAEA over nuclear inspections and the presence of monitors to witness the fuel replacement.

The Blix message was made public in Seoul following unconfirmed South Korean press reports that Washington had agreed to resume high-level talks with North Korea in return for the sampling of the fuel rods at a later date.

The IAEA also said its team could finish inspecting a radiochemical laboratory, from which IAEA inspectors were barred by North Koreans last March, and check surveillance equipments at various nuclear facilities.



In Vienna, IAEA spokesman David Kyd said the inspectors could leave for North Korea any time from Saturday if the response from Pyongyang was positive.

### **IAEA's Blix Sends Letter to DPRK Urging Inspections**

*SK1105020694 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0141 GMT 11 May 94*

[Text] Seoul, May 11 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced Tuesday [10 May] that it will send inspectors "in the next few days" to North Korea to complete monitoring activities begun in March.

Dispatch of the inspectors is conditioned on North Korea delaying the removal of fuel rods from its 5-megawatt reactor, according to a letter from IAEA Director-General Hans Blix addressed to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam.

The agency invited North Korea to send a delegation of experts to Vienna to discuss the inspection timetable.

Blix said he hopes the IAEA and the delegation can negotiate the necessary inspection process for the changing of the fuel rods.

The director-general emphasized in the letter that the rods must remain closed under IAEA seals after they are randomly selected, and various measurements of the rods should be conducted late this year, officials said.

The letter offers hope of a breakthrough in the nuclear impasse since the IAEA proposal, although it carries a condition, leaves aside for now the biggest stumbling block to an inspection agreement.

### **IAEA Team To Leave Earlier if Rod Change 'Serious'**

*SK1505025494 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean  
15 May 94 p 2*

[AFP, YONHAP report from Vienna]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] warned on 14 May that if the work of replacing the North Korean nuclear fuel rods reaches "a serious stage," [sim-gakhan tangye] the IAEA inspection team will suspend its inspection and leave earlier than scheduled.

IAEA spokesman David Kyd said that the inspection team will leave Vienna on 15 May and arrive in Yongbyon, North Korea sometime on 17 May. He said that the inspection team will confirm whether North Korea has just started regular preparation measures to replace the fuel rods at the five megawatt-class atomic reactor or it has already reached "a serious stage" of carrying out the replacement work such as unloading the nuclear rods. He added that the inspection team is scheduled to stay in North Korea for eight days, but that their stay there may be extended.

### **IAEA Inspection Team Leaves for Pyongyang 15 May**

*SK1505232994 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2200 GMT 15 May 94*

[Cha Man-sun reports from Vienna]

[Text] Three members of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team have embarked on a visit to North Korea to confirm whether North Korea's nuclear fuel rods have actually been replaced and to conduct additional inspections.

The three-member inspection team, led by IAEA inspection chief (Hainamen), left for Vienna via China on the evening of 15 May, Korean standard time, and is due to arrive in Beijing at 0840 on 16 May.

The inspection team, entrusted with the special mission to make on-the-spot confirmation of the nuclear fuel rods replacement, will make a stopover in Beijing and arrive in Pyongyang via Koryo Civilian Air on the afternoon of 17 May.

During its stay, the inspection team will confirm on the spot whether nuclear fuel rods at the 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon have actually been replaced. The IAEA will call off its inspection and pull out its team earlier than scheduled if North Korea has removed the nuclear fuel rods seals and replaced the nuclear fuel rods. However, if North Korea has just begun preparations for the nuclear fuel rods replacement, the inspection team will carry out inspection activities until 24 May. It will check seals and replace surveillance equipment at major nuclear facilities, and conduct additional inspections of the radiochemical laboratory.

### **PRC Reportedly Actively Mediating in DPRK Nuclear Issue**

*SK0905141494 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean  
1223 GMT 9 May 94*

[Text] A clue to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is hard to come by because North Korea rejects fuel rods inspections. It has been learned, however, that China is playing an active mediating role.

Zhang Tingyan, Chinese ambassador to the ROK, visited Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong today and reportedly told him that the Chinese Government is actively engaged in persuading North Korea and requested that the Governments of the ROK and the United States deal with the North Korean claims with flexibility.

Ambassador Zhang Tingyan reportedly said that, according to what the Chinese Government has found out, North Korea has not replaced the fuel rods yet and asked that negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue continue. Ambassador Zhang Tingyan's visit to the Foreign Ministry was made at the request of the Chinese side so he would explain the contact between the North Korean and Chinese Governments.

Because it has been revealed that the Chinese Government is actively mediating between North Korea, the ROK, and the United States, negotiations over the nuclear issue, which have run into difficulties because of the North

Korean refusal to replace and safekeep fuel rods, are likely to reach a compromise without dashing toward a catastrophe.

Meanwhile, the ROK and the United States are said to be planning to propose to North Korea that the matter of fuel rods inspection, which North Korea rejects, be solved at the third round of U.S.- North Korean talks without making issue of it any more at the present stage.

It has been reported that the ROK and the United States are planning to disclose their position to begin additional inspections and technological inspections on North Korea around the end of this week and to hold the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks immediately after that.

#### **DPRK's NODONG SINMUN on Japan's Unchanged Nuclear Ambition**

*SK0905055494 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0529 GMT 9 May 94*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 9 (KCNA) —NODONG SINMUN today comments on Japan's decision to postpone the plutonium utility program.

The news analyst says:

Japan's measure does not mean abandoning the plutonium utility program but postponing the construction of a new plutonium production facility.

Japan's abrupt decision to postpone the program is a crafty ruse to convince the world public of its non-nuclear will, avoid international criticism and isolation and create a favorable climate for holding a permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council.

The decision came in the wake of Japan's calculation that the postponement of the construction of a new plutonium production facility will do no harm to its nuclear arms development.

Japan's efforts to convert itself into a military power and arm itself with nuclear weapons are based on revanchism.

The Japanese ruling quarters obsessed with the ambition to lord it over in the international arena as a military and political power regard nuclear armament as an inevitable means to carry into practice their ambition.

With no trick can the Japanese authorities conceal their ambition for nuclear armament.

Japan must give up nuclear armament, mindful that this will lead to its own destruction.

#### **ROK Radio Reports on U.S.-DPRK Contact in New York**

*SK1305004994 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2300 GMT 12 May 94*

[Text] Another working-level contact between North Korea and the United States for the settlement of the North Korean nuclear [issue] was held in New York early this morning, three days after the previous contact.

The contact was held after North Korea had announced it would allow International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspections. The following is a report by correspondent Nam Son-hyon from New York: [begin recording]

**Nam:** The United States and North Korea had a chief and counselor-level working contact for over an hour early this morning to discuss allowing additional inspections [chuga sachal] and the third round of high-level talks.

As the contact was held only a few days after the previous contact on Tuesday and right after the IAEA's announcement of its decision to send an inspection team, a well-informed source said that this implies that a breakthrough will be provided soon through U.S.-North Korea negotiations.

The source said that there had been very positive contents in today's working-level contact noting that the United States reiterated its position on the inspection of fuel rods, which was also mentioned in the previous contact, and that North Korea responded to this.

During today's working-level contact, the United States urged that additional inspections should be properly conducted and stressed that the schedule of the third-round high-level talks should be discussed in the course of observing the development of inspections. North Korea reportedly demanded to hold the third-round talks as soon as possible since additional inspections and regular inspections [chonggi sachal] will be conducted.

The two sides reportedly decided to let the problem concerning inspections of fuel rods be technically solved between the IAEA and North Korea, and to hold another full-scale working-level contact on the third-round talks next week when inspections will be under way. [end recording]

#### **PRK Reportedly Begins Replacing Fuel Rods at Reactor**

*SK1405014494 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2300 GMT 13 May 94*

[Text] The North Korean mission to the United Nations said today that North Korea already started the work of replacing fuel rods at a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor without the presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. We have news by reporter Nam Son-hyon from New York. [begin recording]

**Nam:** The North Korean mission to the United Nations said that it sent a telex to IAEA Director General Hans Blix on 13 May in the name of Pak Yong-nam, director of North Korean Atomic Energy General Department, officially notifying him that North Korea had started to replace fuel rods at the nuclear power plant [wonjaryok palchonsoe yonryobong kyochechakopi sichaktoeumul].

According to the telex message sent by Pak Yong-nam, specially obtained by KBS, North Korea noted that from late April to early this month, it had notified the IAEA on four occasions that it could no longer delay the replacement of fuel rods. North Korea said that it regrets that it could no longer delay the replacement of fuel rods at the nuclear reactor because of technical and safety problems [kisuljogurona anjonsangmunjerona to isang kyochechakopul mirulsuopssu].

Director Pak Yong-nam said in the telex message: In spite of the special status [tuksuhan chiwiaroesodo] with the IAEA, North Korea has provided sufficient conditions to guarantee the continuity of safeguards regarding the

replacement of fuel rods, but the IAEA Secretariat did not respond to North Korea's good will [sonuijogin yogu], and instead put forward unreasonable conditions [pudanghan chogonul].

North Korea said, however, that there are many opportunities for future negotiations regarding the issue because it just began the work, and stressed that if the IAEA shows its fair position, North Korea could allow the IAEA to choose and keep [sontaekkwā pogwan] fuel rods while they are being replaced. It also said that the future negotiations would be more productive when they are held at the place near the area where the work of replacing fuel rods is being started.

North Korea added in the telex message that it believes that it is fortunate that the IAEA has decided, though belatedly, to send the inspection team to Pyongyang and that it is ready to accept the inspection activities of an experimental nuclear power plant and a radiochemical laboratory, as mentioned earlier. [end recording]

#### **PRC Reportedly Sent DPRK Warning Urging IAEA Inspections**

SK1305050894 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
13 May 94 p 1

[Mun Il-hyon from Beijing]

[Text] It has been learned that China recently sent an official warning message to North Korea urging it not to change nuclear fuel rods by itself without the presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and to allow additional inspections by the IAEA at the earliest possible date.

In particular, China sternly warned that changing nuclear fuel rods on North Korea's own would be a definite violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and would result not only in terrifying denunciation from the international community, but also in making sanctions against North Korea inevitable.

The above was revealed by a high-level diplomatic source in Beijing on 12 May who added: "The strong warning from China was an important motive behind North Korea's recent announcement to allow the additional inspections by the IAEA and to postpone the changing of nuclear fuel rods."

#### **DPRK Criticizes IAEA, U.S. on Japan's 'Plutonium Concealment'**

SK1405050394 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0447 GMT 14 May 94

["Nuclear Culprit Caught Red-handed"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—70 kg of unregistered plutonium in pure powder was discovered recently at a reactor of the Tokai nuclear fuel plant of Japan.

Commenting on this, NODONG SINMUN today brands this case as a product of conspiracy among Japan, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] which had carried out its inspection and the United States which had manipulated the IAEA.

The news analyst says:

The hiding of plutonium by Japan shows there is a grave problem in IAEA inspections and nuclear non-proliferation.

The hypocrisy of Japan, a double-dealer, has been stripped naked and its wild ambition to become a nuclear power exposed as a stark fact.

It has been proved that the Japanese Government's persistent pressure on the DPRK over the "nuclear issue" was a despicable drama to conceal its criminal nuclear arms development.

Facts clearly show Japan is a culprit who deliberately violated the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The plutonium concealment also causes grave doubt as to the impartiality of IAEA inspections.

The IAEA had said the nuclear facilities of Japan were under its strict inspections, but had never reported that there was a problem.

While closing its eye to Japan concealing a large amount of plutonium, the IAEA has faked up "suspicion of nuclear programme" of the DPRK and framed every conceivable intrigues to have "sanctions" taken at the United Nations organisation. This is an act contrary to the basic mission of the IAEA and the culmination of its application of a double standard.

This eloquently proves that the IAEA is rather used as a shameful political tool of the superpower than performing its duty and mission.

The United States is also involved in the problem. The U.S. Government, aware of Japan's concealment of plutonium, has kept silence and connived at Japan's nuclear development.

It is shameful of the United States to hurl mud at the peaceful nuclear activities of the DPRK that offer no problem and threaten it with the use of arms such as "preemptive strike" while keeping mum about Japan's concealment of plutonium, a big problem.

This shows the United States does not intend to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but is using the nuclear issue for a sinister political purpose.

Japan must frankly open to the public the whole amount of plutonium it has stockpiled in secrecy and give up the nuclear armament programme.

The IAEA must observe the principle of impartiality in accordance with its mission.

The United States must refrain from using the nuclear issue for a sinister political purpose against the DPRK and from applying the double standard.

### More on DPRK Changing Nuclear Fuel Rods Without IAEA

SK1405014894 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0114 GMT 14 May 94

[Text] Washington, May 13 (YONHAP)—North Korea has already begun changing nuclear fuel rods at the 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon without the supervision of International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspectors.

In a telex message sent to IAEA headquarters in Vienna on Thursday, North Korea also said it was prepared to allow additional IAEA inspections of a key radiochemical laboratory.

Despite the latest development, the IAEA plans to send a team of inspectors on Sunday to check the radiochemical laboratory and service surveillance equipment in other facilities, IAEA spokesman David Kyd said in Vienna Friday.

The agency had insisted that its inspectors must be present when North Korea changes nuclear fuel rods at the 5-megawatt reactor. The IAEA said it would send inspectors only when Pyongyang postponed the refueling.

Nevertheless, the U.N. nuclear watchdog has decided to dispatch inspectors in the apparent belief that North Korea has not yet removed the fuel rods from the reactor, informed sources here said.

The United States has also said it would suspend dialogue with North Korea if it changed the fuel rods without an IAEA presence. But the sources said Washington will now decide whether to hold a third round of high-level talks after learning the outcome of the IAEA inspections.

State Department deputy spokesman David Johnson said Washington was not in a position to comment on further talks with North Korea until it heard from the IAEA on the result of the upcoming inspections. The IAEA alone must determine whether the continuity of nuclear safeguards in North Korea has been maintained, Johnson said. Only then will the U.S. Government decide on the third round of negotiations.

What the United States is interested in right now is to choose the spent nuclear fuel rods at random and preserve them for later checks, said another State Department official, requesting anonymity.

Another diplomatic source here said "All is not clear at the moment" with regard to the changing of the nuclear fuel rods. However, it appears that North Korea has just begun preparations for refueling, rather than having taken fuel rods out of the reactor, he added.

The contents of Pyongyang's message to the IAEA will not influence the prospect for U.S.-North Korean talks, he said, adding that a firm evaluation of the overall situation will be made after the IAEA inspectors' visit.

Meanwhile, Pak Yong-nam, minister of the Atomic Energy Industry, said in the telex to the IAEA that North Korea was compelled to begin changing nuclear fuel rods because the IAEA had failed to send an inspection team, attaching unjustifiable conditions.

The message was addressed to IAEA Secretary-general Hans Blix.

Pyongyang nevertheless welcomed the IAEA's decision to send inspectors, though belatedly. North Korea will allow them to inspect its experimental nuclear power generating station and the radiochemical laboratory in order to maintain the continuity of nuclear safeguards, it said.

North Korea has also proposed resuming negotiations with the IAEA to resolve complicated problems with the refueling.

It would be more productive to hold the negotiations close to where the refueling is proceeding, it said, hinting that it wants to hold talks in Pyongyang.

Referring to the refueling, North Korea said work has just begun and that there would be many opportunities for the IAEA to collect the spent fuel rods at random and preserve them.

### DPRK Denounces Discovery of Plutonium in Japan

SK1505090494 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0851 GMT 15 May 94

["Japan's Nuclear Ambition Dragged Into the Open"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 15 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comments on the recent discovery of 70 kilograms of pure plutonium enough for the manufacture of nine nuclear bombs at reactors of the fissionable material producing processes in the Tokaimura Atomic Industrial Centre, Japan.

The analyst says:

Japan has never let a chance pass by without saying the production and stockpile of a large quantity of plutonium in the country were for "a peaceful purpose" and it would not lead to the conversion of Japan into a nuclear power. It has also boastfully claimed that it is "a model" in accepting inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But it was fully revealed this time that all this was a lie.

The analyst continues:

Pretending to open to the public the amount of stockpiled plutonium, Japan has concealed a part of it. This proves that it has invariably stepped up the design to turn itself into a nuclear power under the cloak of "a peaceful purpose."

Broad public circles of the world have considered that Japan's stockpile of plutonium more than necessary is related to its design to become a nuclear power.

The Japanese authorities are now clamouring about "investigation" and "removal of misgivings." This is, however, a belated excuse.

Japan's nuclear design remains unchanged. It is racing headlong toward nuclear armament.

Its nuclear armament poses a serious threat to the peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.



### IAEA Experts Hold Seminar on Reducing Uranium Mining

AU1305141394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech 10 May 94 p 2

["sa"-signed report: "Experts Assessed the Reduction of Uranium Mining"]

[Text] Straz pod Ralskem—The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna has organized a conference on the Reduction of Uranium Mining. The foremost experts in nuclear physics from Europe, the United States, Australia, and Japan exchanged in Straz pod Ralskem their experience in closing down uranium mines. J. Mrkvicka, director of the Diama state enterprise, told a HOSPODARSKE NOVINY correspondent that they are looking into the problems of chemical mining in northern Bohemia with the IAEA. The results of the conference did not cast any doubts on the current practice of uranium mining reduction. At present, the mining at the Hamr pit in the Ceska Lipa region is closed (its conservation is being prepared), and the conservation of the Straz pod Ralskem chemical preparation plant is under way.

### IAEA Team Arrives in Beijing En Route to Pyongyang

OW1605122894 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1206 GMT 16 May 94

[Text] Beijing, May 16 KYODO—Three inspectors from the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arrived in Beijing on Monday [16 May] on their way to monitor the refueling of a North Korean nuclear facility.

The team from the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency is scheduled to leave Beijing for Pyongyang on Tuesday and to begin inspection of a 5-megawatt experimental nuclear plant at Yongbyon, near Pyongyang, on Wednesday.

Despite a North Korean announcement Saturday that it had removed seals and started replacing spent fuel rods at the reactor, the team will continue with a previous agreement and monitor the refueling process, team leader Olli Heinonen said.

An IAEA spokesman said Saturday in Vienna that if North Korea commits a serious violation of the nuclear safeguard agreement, such as removing seals from the fuel rod container, the team may suspend the scheduled inspections.

"We just want to check and see for ourselves and then we'll all be much wiser," Heinonen told KYODO NEWS SERVICE in Beijing.

Heinonen, who has been to North Korea "many times," refused to comment on the nuclear situation there, nor would he comment on whether his team shares any concerns over North Korean safety precautions.

"We've been to many countries and we've seen many plants and many situations," he said.

The Yongbyon plant is at present supposedly undergoing its initial refueling, although U.S. intelligence reports say the plant may have been refueled in 1989.

The IAEA inspectors hope to verify whether refueling took place in 1989 and whether or not any of the spent fuel has been diverted to other uses, particularly military uses.

The IAEA team also hopes to inspect a laboratory that it was denied access to during an uncompleted inspection in March, Heinonen said.

Western countries suspect the lab is involved in a program to produce nuclear arms.

Heinonen said his team will collect as much data as possible and return "in about a week" to Vienna where the inspectors will formulate a report with other IAEA experts.

### IAEA Team Begins Inspection of Yongbyon Nuclear Facility

SK1805115794 Seoul KBS-I Radio Network in Korean  
1020 GMT 18 May 94

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] announced that the IAEA inspection team, which entered North Korea yesterday [17 May], today arrived in Yongbyon, the site of inspection, and has begun inspection activities.

The inspection team will watch [kamsi] the work of replacing nuclear fuel rods in Yongbyon and conduct additional inspection of the radiochemical experimental power station. The United States and IAEA have high expectations for the inspection team's activities.

After arriving in Yongbyon today, the IAEA inspection team, composed of three inspectors, started the work of confirming whether fuel rods were replaced by examining surveillance cameras and seals installed in the nuclear reactor.

Even if North Korea has launched the work of replacing nuclear fuel rods, the IAEA will persuade North Korea through various negotiation channels to allow the inspection team to optionally select nuclear fuel rods from nuclear reactor at the initial stage of replacement and to store them in a separate special instrument. The reason for this is that if the inspection team takes a sample from storage house after the replacement of the fuel rods is completed, the team cannot examine the precise amount of nuclear material already converted.

The IAEA maintains that the sample-taking during the time of replacing the nuclear fuel rods is indispensable for deciding whether the North Korean report that damaged fuel rods were replaced only once since the operation began in 1986 is true or not and for finding out the exact quantity of fuel rods replaced.

Therefore, the IAEA inspection team will decide the extent of progress in the replacement of nuclear fuel rods and examine whether the precise sample-taking is feasible at the present stage or not. The inspection team is given a special mission to urgently report the result of its aforementioned activities.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration has expectations for the result of the activities by the IAEA inspection team in North Korea.

During a regular briefing today, U.S. Defense Department spokesman (Box) expressed an optimistic view, stating that the inspection team will complete inspections of the seven declared nuclear facilities, which remained unsolved last March, and will go into the nuclear reactor in question in Yongbyon and replace film and batteries.

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